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28 October 1980

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NAVAL UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Long-Cruise Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jun 80 p 1

[Article: "Experience of Long Cruises"]

[Text] Summer combat training is at its height. Sailors, just as all warriors in the Soviet Armed Forces, are struggling actively and selflessly to meet their socialist pledges made for the year; far from native shores, they are persistently carrying out their combat training missions. The coordination of the crews and their skill and ability to act in a fast-moving situation are being tested impartially on long cruises.

On extended cruises on the expanses of the world ocean, expertise is gained in organizing combat training and making effective use of each mile passed. This is where the concepts for new tactics originate, rationalizers make valuable suggestions aimed at increasing navigation safety and the reliability of equipment and weaponry, and ways to save energy are sought. On the ocean, the sailors are trained to hit targets with the first salvo. Captains and crews contribute to developing the art of navigation and search creatively for new ways of waging sea combat that meet today's needs.

The ship commanded by officer V. Feoktistov, bearer of the orders "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" II and III degrees, returns from cruises to base each time with high results in military labor. All missions assigned for the cruise are executed by the sailors only excellently and well. On the last long cruise, a new detachment of masters of combat skill and specialists first class was trained. Full interchangeability was practiced for many combat posts. Definite experience was gained on other ships in this unit too.

But all that is better and progressive acquires the highest practical value only when it becomes known to all the crews and is effectively used to raise the combat readiness of all ships. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has designated support and dissemination of expertise and progressive forms and methods of work among the main directions of organizational, political and ideological work.

In the unit in question, the commander, political department and staff pay continual attention to the study, generalization and introduction of innovations that originate on the ships. Officers B. Prikhod'ko, O. Grons'kiy, V. Zimin and others have a creative attitude toward this important matter. New commanders here are trained to go to sea based on the experience of their senior comrades. This helps them to act confidently, decisively and efficiently under the complex conditions of ocean cruises. Participating in the detailed analyses of each long cruise is of great benefit to the ship captains, especially the new ones. In this unit, ship department commanders report what they did on the cruise to raise combat training quality and socialist competition effectiveness. Based on their reports, appropriate recommendations are worked out and given to specialists on the other ships.

Many such examples can be cited. The majority of flag and staff officers conduct the cruise critique in a reasonable manner with a detailed analysis of the actions of a ship's captain in a specific situation. However, elements of formalism and eyewash in this important matter have not been completely eliminated. Here and there, generalization of know-how by critique has even stopped. Some commanders, staff officers and flag specialists overlook the main thing--they do not analyze how the commander, crew or subunit achieved high results. Some officers willingly recognize the need for active study and generalization of the experience that originates far from the bases, but go no further than general words and appeals. And the experience, at times interesting and very valuable, never sees the light of day and becomes obsolete.

The search for new methods and their generalization and introduction into practice is a commander's duty under the regulations. Together with the political worker and the party organization, the commander instills in all officers the need to deepen their knowledge and the aspiration to creatively solve each problem and to take a close look at the achievements of their colleagues. Party committees and bureaus are called upon to combat the beaten track and to purposefully strive to see that generalization of combat training experience and party and political work as well as indoctrination of personnel with the spirit of high consciousness and responsibility for faultless performance of their military duty is conducted on a genuinely scientific basis.

The staff has to show consideration for experience. It is up to the staffs to polish the technique of bringing to light and introducing all that is progressive. To more fully and effectively disseminate experience, the staffs organize various measures on the best ships: demonstrations, studies, training sessions, practical firing, etc. Naturally, such steps are beneficial if they are well prepared and take into account achievements on the ship. Personal appearances of the originators of progressive ways of using equipment and weapons play a great role in disseminating this experience in seminars and assemblies conducted by staffs.

The volume of missions to be executed on the ocean and the intensity of combat training are growing every year. A continual rejuvenation of ship and subunit commanders occurs. Therefore, officers from staffs and political agencies are frequently on board. Temporary formations--cruise staffs--are sometimes organized. The duty of the flag and cruise staff officers is to ensure directly at sea those conditions that promote a broad exchange of experience among commanders of ships and the crews. Joint cruises of several ships and anchorages, in particular, provide good opportunities for this. Active forms of exchange of experience on the ocean enrich the sailors with knowledge and skills and help avoid mistakes.

The experience of socialist competition, a powerful incentive to raising sailors' creative activity and initiative, should be inculcated persistently. Publicity, comparability, competitiveness and mutual assistance promote growth in sailors' skills and the strengthening of organization and order and help to bring shortcomings to light in a timely fashion and eliminate them. Raising the quality of mission execution on cruises is promoted by the active campaign for the best ship, for victory in competitions on fire and tactical training, and the movement for the leading task force. Propaganda of the achievements of the leaders and uncovering the ways to their success must be constantly at the center of attention of flag officers, political agencies, staffs and party and Komsomol organizations.

The study, generalization and introduction into practice of all that is innovative and progressive that originates on long cruises is the duty and a matter of honor of every Soviet sailor. The skillful use of such a resource as this experience is the reliable guarantee of fresh successes in the summer training period, in strengthening discipline, and raising the vigilance of personnel and ship combat readiness.

Watch Officer Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jun 80 p 2

[Article by V. Dobrovol'skiy, captain 3rd rank and an officer on the main naval staff, in the column: "On the Subjects of Pedagogy and Psychology": "The Watch--a Special Service"]

[Text] Naval ship regulations state: "The watch officer commands the ship's watch service." The key word here is "commands." That is, he acts aggressively and with initiative: he evaluates a situation, makes a decision, makes it known to the executors and then supervises carrying it out. Naturally, when a ship's captain or executive officer taking the captain's place is in the main control room (GKP), they exercise command of the ship. There are some captains who regard the watch officer as a person who only has to have the ability to repeat in a loud voice what the captain says quietly and to maintain the ship's log.

In the majority of cases, the captain cannot rely on such a watch officer. And if circumstances should require independent action by the officer, for

example, employment of weapons for ship self-defense during an enemy surprise attack, he would often not be prepared for this.

There was such a case in my own experience as a captain. My ship was taking part in an exercise. After strenuous work, we received a short rest at anchorage. The air defense equipment and teams remained ready for immediate action, and the watch officers were to organize "fire" on any air targets that entered the lethal area. Nevertheless, on Senior Lieutenant Pankeyev's watch, air targets were let through, which could have had sad consequences in a combat situation. I had to conduct a critique of the errors of their comrade with the watch officers, but the air targets continued to penetrate or the "hit" was delayed.

I took over the ship shortly before the exercise and had not yet sized up the training level of the watch officers. The lessons learned from the exercise forced me to pay a great deal of attention to this.

It was a curious situation. Most of the officers had quite good skills. But they were unable to apply them in practice. Why? They had no psychological confidence in themselves since that had not even been required of them before. They thought the captain and exec would handle any situation themselves.

This state of affairs led first to the need to have either the captain or exec in the GKP at all times. And second, if one of them got sick or was even "removed" in following the exercise scenario, not to mention possible combat losses, the reliability of command of the ship would decline sharply.

This situation was totally unacceptable. Watch officer training had to be brought up to the requirements of naval ship regulations. The evaluation criteria of our errors and achievements chosen from the outset was the uncompromising criteria of the ship's combat readiness and the readiness of its GKP for reliable, efficient and skillful execution of navigation and tactical missions.

Let me say right off that the main difficulty I had to overcome was psychological, as do other ship captains. It consists in a simple fact: to give watch officers practical training, complete command of the ship has to be entrusted to them on a systematic and continuing basis. There can, of course, be no leveling nor beaten track here: the specific content and degree of commander's trust depend on the watch officer's experience and capability. But the goal is the same with any officer: to prepare him for executing the majority of the missions on his own. Official recognition of this training level is the order permitting a watch officer to command a ship on his own. And this is now the exec level and an order to advance the officer through the command line.

Of course, psychologically, it is just not that easy for a captain to frequently "withdraw" from command of his ship. But if you want to train

reliable deputies (and does anyone need an unreliable deputy?), then each watch has to be utilized for this. Simply introduce the rule: Each new watch officer must master a series of training problems that are connected both with problems resolved on the cruise, as well as with problems that will develop his practical qualifications for a given officer. This arrangement is beneficial to both trainees and trainer. This makes it possible for the captain, in particular, to develop pedagogical self-mastery. While mastering new problems, watch officers make quite a few mistakes. This is natural, but the captain has to suppress his inner desire to immediately intervene, to immediately correct, and to immediately point out the proper course. However, experience shows that it does not pay to be in a hurry. If the watch officer's mistakes are no threat to the ship's safety, then let him solve the problem as he can. There have been cases, for example, when a watch officer managed to guide his ship's stern up to a floating object (while practicing the elements of scoring), even though he was supposed to come up along side of it. Well, what happens in such cases? The maneuver's result is there for all to see, the officer is embarrassed, and he has a strong desire to find out why he made his mistakes. But if you "overrule" him after his first wrong command, the training result is zero, and a lot of nerves and efforts will then be in vain.

Some captains work with the watch officers only in the GKP and prefer to place the rest of the "burden" on the exec. The exec conducts the tactical meetings, group exercises, seminars and test activities, while the captain approves the activity plans and expresses his dissatisfaction with these or those deficiencies.

This violates a methodological requirement: the captain has to personally take part in all forms of watch officer training. This raises the prestige of the training in the eyes of the officers, while the captain gets to know his subordinates better and the strong and weak points of their training. There is no question that this places an additional load on the captain. But avoiding it does not make it easier on him. On the contrary, he will have to double his efforts to correct somebody else's unfinished work.

In determining the specific amount and content of training, two factors have to be considered: the ship's missions and the specific situation in the cruise area. For example, prior to and during execution of antisubmarine missions, we thoroughly analyzed the requirements of the directives on antisubmarine defense in tactical meetings. And during training exercises in the GKP, watch officers practiced directing the sonar teams, interaction with the navigator, and organization of ship damage control. The tactical training problems were based on submarine capabilities of the probable enemy.

One time I was called to the communications room for discussions with a flag officer. The exec replaced me and Captain-Lieutenant Kasatochkin was the watch officer. In my absence, a sonarman reported the assumed presence of echo-contact with a submerged target. Kasatochkin brought the ship to an advantageous position relative to the target, organized classification of

the contact, and requested the captain come to the GKP. We subsequently confirmed the contact after a long period, but success was decided by those seconds when the watch officer acted on his own. He was ready for this psychologically, and the comprehensive purposefulness of the activities and training exercises played no small role in this.

In organizing training, one must remember that in combat, situations can arise that are capable of paralyzing the will of the watch officer if he has not been prepared with psychological protection against stress overloads. The shortest path to this goal lies in organizing, concealed from the watch officer, equipment "breakdowns," "failures" and "damages." It is one thing if the watch officer gets a verbal and quite clearly conventional problem. But it is a different matter if the gyrocompass repeater unexpectedly does not match the other instruments, current to the engine telegraph is really interrupted, or the hydraulic drives stop turning the rudder.

Few do not get flustered at first. But the psychological stability of the officer grows from watch to watch and from training exercise to training exercise. And in the end, he becomes ready to handle ship damage control and wage combat when a "fire" breaks out in a machine, the traditional command scheme is "interrupted," etc.

Training of watch officers, as for all sailors, has to be organized in such a way that not only combat norms are practiced, but also that the will of people is seasoned, and that endurance, boldness and combat aggressiveness are developed in them, in other words, the educational role of combat training is increased. Of special importance to moral-political and psychological seasoning of warriors are long cruises and complication of the situation in training and exercises.

A watch officer's attitude toward mastering his duties plays a great role in his development. The psychological motives of a man's behavior cannot be disregarded. And in this sense, it is easiest of all to work with those who see themselves as future ship captains, and it is especially difficult with those who "do not need to be best." Some think as if the watch in the GKP takes them away from performing their primary service duties in the role of group and subunit commanders. Wherever underestimation of the role of the watch officer on the GKP team is tolerated, there may be certain subjective grounds for such attitudes. But in the majority of cases, such views originate from a narrow understanding of their functional duties and a lowered self-exactingness. There cannot be two opinions: the watch officer does not acquire "superfluous" skills and knowledge, but a broad view of the ship tactics, its technical capabilities, and organization of the interaction of all combat crews. In light of this view, any subunit commander better understands the role and place of his equipment and his crew in the ship structure, and it is easier for him to implement the commander's concepts. This also helps in planning activities by specialty and in independent training.

But this happens only when work with watch officers is conducted creatively, taking into account the requirements of military pedagogy and psychology.

Firing Training Criticism

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jun 80 p 1

[Article by Captain 3d Rank V. Shirokov, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "The Cost of Leniency." under the rubric "Competition-High Efficiency"]

[Text] The patrol ship "Leningradskiy komsomolets" began the winter training period on the crest of success. Now, in the summer training period, the crew is rarely recalled. And even when it is, as a rule, it is a negative example. What happened?

"If it had not been for that firing . . .," the talk on the ship now goes, believing quite sincerely that one firing alone, performed not very qualitatively, marred them for the year. At first glance, it seems like that is actually the way it is: due to chance, the ship said good-bye to its past glory.

And its glory was not insignificant. In the results for the past training year, the "Leningradskiy komsomolets" was awarded first place in its unit. The ship sailed a great deal, executed combat training missions, and invariably received good and excellent evaluations. So when the sailors made their socialist pledges for the current training year, very high goals were set. And just in general, this is laudable--rightflankers are supposed to maintain a wide pace. The missile-artillery department (BCh-2), headed by Captain-Lieutenant M. Bastynets, for example, pledged to perform all fire missions with only high evaluations, while the officers, warrant officers, petty officers and seamen promised to raise their proficiency rating one degree, or if applicable, confirm their high rating.

The full efforts of everyday combat training went by quickly. In the concluding stage of the winter training period, the crew had to perform firing and show once again that the ship rightly held the position of the leader in the unit.

Outwardly, everything on the ship was well. Even when the course problems were dealt with, the crew received no special comments from the staff officers. True, minor derelictions were detected, but no serious attention was paid to them. Everyone's thoughts were on the future: how the crew would pass the main test--execution of a firing mission. An excellent evaluation would leave the ship on the top step of the pedestal, but a lower evaluation would mean the step would have to be given up to others.

Dense, gray, storm clouds were hovering over the sea that day, and a fresh wind was blowing in from the north. The patrol ship set out for the area assigned. Everything took its normal course among the crew: watches were

changed, radio operators were reporting, the weather to the main control room, and sonarmen were listening to the depths of the sea, trying not to miss the submerged "enemy."

Captain-Lieutenant M. Bastynets, commander of the missile-artillery department, maintained complete calm: he was convinced there would be success. But that is not what happened! The combat commander's mood was transmitted to his subordinates too. It seemed to them that they were fully ready to perform any mission.

Belief in one's own strengths is necessary, of course. But this should have nothing in common with complacency. The sailors' behavior prior to this decisive test, speaking mildly, was incomprehensible. They did not bother themselves with either additional training exercises or activities. Speaking frankly, they rested.

But the situation demanded aggressive activity. In performing their training missions, aircraft attacked the ship from all directions and at varying altitudes. This afforded extensive opportunities for training the combat crews. But these opportunities were not exploited. On one day of the cruise, when summing up competition results, the ship captain however could no longer stand it and criticized the sailors in BCh-2 for their scornful attitude toward training exercises. However, unfortunately, the matter went no further than this criticism. The ship captain took no decisive steps. The department officers, including Senior Lieutenant V. Bondarenko, the party group organizer, continued to idly languish pending firing for record.

The hope that everything would turn out right by itself imperceptibly became the characteristic mood in the department. Somehow, the sailors were really very confident of their skill, believing they understood everything and that excellent results were already in their pocket, as they say. And nobody reminded them that a component of true mastery is professional maturity which presupposes a self-critical attitude towards one's achievements and the ability to see things in perspective and not rest on one's laurels.

Even when Seaman N. Shkepp did not meet combat norms in preparation fire, the event did not receive due analysis and severe evaluation. And this "failure" was made by a sailor in his third year of service. Such a mistake ought to make an attentive commander wonder whether everything is right with the subunit's personnel training. But, unfortunately, the department commander looked through his fingers at this too.

Soothed by past successes, the ship's party organization eased its exactingness too. Not one communist from BCh-2 was heard in the party bureau during the entire winter training period. And what to say there. A party meeting was not even held prior to performing the most important fire mission--so strong was the confidence of success.

but the impossible does not happen. The crew's skill was inadequate to hit the target like a sharpshooter, for it has not increased during the months of training, but had been lost.

Yes, few merit the high position. One has to be ready for it mentally and one has to hold on to it. And in reality, the crew on the "Leningradskiy komsomolets" had not been trained for leadership in competition. Evidence of this is the fact that in November of last year, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a critical report, "An Indicator Not Considered," that related the disorders in management on the ship. For obscure reasons, the staff and political department decided to not take the deficiencies revealed by the newspaper into account when summing up the competition results. An awkward situation resulted: the crew read the unflattering remarks about themselves in the paper and the criticism was recognized as correct on the ship, yet the "Leningradskiy komsomolets" was still named the leading ship in the fleet. Such a turn of affairs was bewildering to many sailors.

And now we find the crew has not met their socialist pledges made for the course and winter training period. Unfortunately, no lessons from this misfortune have been learned on the ship. We are now about a month into the summer training period. The impression is left that here again leniency is being relied upon. But experience has shown that no small price has to be paid for leniency.

Navigators' Training Duties

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Dec 60 p. 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Yu. Zheglow, flag navigator of the Red Banner Northern Fleet, in the column "Needed for the Ocean": "Navigation Training for the Captain"]

[Text] A submarine that carried out the returned to base. The crew had executed combat training missions and the captain had succeeded in achieving high indicators in maintaining the readiness of the cruise. It would seem that his actions could be regarded as a high score. But with more detailed analysis, we can see that the captain had not always proceeded from the interests of maintaining constant readiness of the ship for effective employment in the waters.

Of course, the captain was in the right in his particular decision in this specific situation. However, in the long run, it was not the conditions of the situation that prompted the ship's captain to display uncharacteristic leniency, but the desire to simplify the situation on board.

"If I had been on board, that would not have happened," the flag navigator who had trained this captain was explaining.

Of course he would have been able to influence the captain's decision. But even so there is generally no need for this. The flag navigator's duty is to

not only have the opportunity to receive a high-quality education and for
the 1980s, when the 1980s will be the 1980s, when the 1980s will be the 1980s
and the 1980s will be the 1980s.

At the same time, the 1980s will be the 1980s, when the 1980s will be the 1980s
and the 1980s will be the 1980s, when the 1980s will be the 1980s
and the 1980s will be the 1980s.

I remember how I began my service in the 1980s, when the 1980s will be the 1980s. Quite
often, I felt that I was not doing my job properly. I did not have full
confidence in myself, and I was not sure that I was doing my job properly. I
was not sure that I was doing my job properly, and I was not sure that I was
doing my job properly. I was not sure that I was doing my job properly, and I
was not sure that I was doing my job properly.

During the 1980s, I was not sure that I was doing my job properly. I was not
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sure that I was doing my job properly, and I was not sure that I was doing my
job properly.

Once I went to sea on a submarine, I was not sure that I was doing my job
properly. I was not sure that I was doing my job properly, and I was not
sure that I was doing my job properly. I was not sure that I was doing my
job properly, and I was not sure that I was doing my job properly. I was not
sure that I was doing my job properly, and I was not sure that I was doing my
job properly.

In time, other captains began listening to me. I tried to avoid being
patronizing, gave my advice, and let the captain decide when the situation really
required this. Since then I have been firmly convinced that, while res-
pecting a captain's pride and not interfering with his authority, but consis-
tently and firmly pursuing my goal, success can be achieved.

Unfortunately, relations between captains and flag specialists at times de-
velop not quite properly. This happens when there occurs an unhealthy,
zealous delimitation of their duties and a defense of principles instead
of a joint effort to solve common problems. As ship regulations state, a
flag specialist is bound in certain cases to decisively intervene in the
actions of a ship department commander right up to suspending operation of
equipment, after informing the commander's captain about this. That is, the
staff specialist directly affects the commander's sphere and intervenes in
the command of the ship. In doing so, one must be guided, certainly, by
one thing--by the interests of the matter. It is just that behavior and
that position that will be properly evaluated by ship captains and agree to
strengthen mutual service relations.

It is difficult for the new flag officer to solve such problems in the early stages. Just recently he was known as a department commander, and now in some things he has to be higher than the ship's captain. But the difficulties of the first steps will pass quickly if the new staff officer knows how to display professional maturity and find his place in the common cause of improving combat readiness.

Unfortunately, some think their sole concern is the good condition of the equipment and the faultlessness of its preparation on ships. True, this is an important task. But it is not the only one and not even the main one facing flag specialists. The criteria of the work of a flag navigator in the first place are the level of navigational culture in the unit and the quality of navigation training of officers, and especially of ship captains. The level of their navigation qualification is the measure of the effectiveness of a flag navigator's work.

For the fleet command, this becomes evident during the work of the fleet commissions with officers taking the examinations for independent control of a ship. For example, candidates coming from the unit where Captain 2d Rank V. Makoda serves pass their examinations with practically no failures. But you see they undergo an especially thorough test on navigation training. About half the time allotted for taking the examinations goes to this. There is no doubt that as a whole the training for ship captain candidates in this unit has been set up well and their "reserve of sound knowledge" on the specialty of navigation is high. And it is not without reason that the crews in just this unit are distinguished by their high navigational culture and that navigational accidents (errors) here are a great rarity. In recent years, there have been none at all.

The role of the flag navigator is a great one and is constantly growing. But the effectiveness of the work of these officers depends largely on their authority. The duty of formation commanders and chiefs of staffs, to whom the flag specialists are immediately subordinate, is to teach them to see this. But of course in the first place, it is up to the staff officer himself on what scale he sees his functional duties: whether he considers himself a specialist by chance, unsystematically scattering his efforts and attention on trivia, or whether he is aware, as the primary navigation specialist for the unit, of his responsibility for the overall level of navigation culture in the formation and for the level of the navigation skill of the commanders and officers.

Once, I had a critical conversation on navigational preparation with a staff officer. One of his subordinates taking the examination for independent control of a ship showed surprisingly weak navigation knowledge at the fleet commission. And this was not detected right away. As long as the questions dealt with pure theory, the officer held his own quite confidently, but even very conventional practice--on a mock-up table--put him in a deadend. Did the unit's navigator know about this officer's weakness? He had to know. Well then he had a formal attitude toward his training. But you see executive officers and new ship captains take the tests for independent control not to navigate hypothetically, by charts, but in a practical way, at sea.

Within the limits of his authority, he gives effective help to the captain. Within the bounds of his specialty (the major one for the officer, controlling a ship), he can and has to know the degree of training of each captain better than anyone, inform the formation commander of his strong and weak points, and take steps to give the help needed.

In all time, increasingly, the demands of navigation and the demands on navigators are continually becoming more exact. A captain, bearing a very heavy service load, does not always manage to keep up with these changes. It is the flag navigator's duty to continually train and bring the captains up to today's requirements. And this has to be done systematically so that captains will need to be continuing work on themselves and meet the need for this.

While waiting for the tests for authorization to control a ship or for confirmation of this authorization, captains are usually faced with the task of finding navigator errors in the test course plot. Time is limited and the mistakes are far from always being easy to spot. Frankly, the test is difficult. But after all, at sea and in combat, the captain is the highest authority. In any situation, his opinion is taken for truth. And no matter how strong the ship's navigator is professionally, the captain has to know how to control the ship and how to find a degree higher than the navigator.

As a flag navigator in the fleet, I myself always experience great anxiety in these tests. You see it is not only a question of what the captain knows how to do, but also what we taught him and how we prepared him for navigating on his own thousands of miles away from native shores, under the ice of the Arctic and in the most varied regions of the world ocean. If flag specialists evaluate their daily work from these positions, not separating themselves from the captain, but seeing themselves through them, then their authority will be great and the benefit to the fleet greater. It is well known that the fleet's combat readiness depends largely on how great the navigation qualification of their captains is.

Role of Master Technicians

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 80 p 1

[Article by Captain 2d Rank L. Musyeyan, master of combat skill, in the column "Efficiency, Creative Approach": "Masters Mature in the Collective"]

[Text] A submarine returned from a long cruise. The sailors had successfully performed complex combat training missions and a critical missile launch. The whole crew worked intensively during the cruise. But an especially great contribution to the common success was made by the submariners who are the highest rated specialists, the masters. These are Captain-Lieutenant V. Borkov, missile department commander; Warrant Officer V. Volushin, missileman team chief; Warrant Officer S. Nozhivenko, navigational electrician.

team chief, and others. In the most difficult moments of the cruise, the captain relied primarily on their high-level, deepened theoretical knowledge and extensive practical experience. The contribution by the masters to victory in practice cannot now also be decisive.

Masters play a major role in repair and maintenance collectively, but especially on ships making long cruises. Imagine this situation: on the ocean, far from native shores, a complicated instrument failed; the instrument is usually repaired only in base facilities by ship or plant specialists. A difficult situation, but not hopeless, as practice shows. If there are true masters on board, without fail they will cope with the matter.

On the submarine in question, repair and prescribed maintenance operations of great complexity are being successfully performed both at the base and on a cruise. The skill of officer Bekey, warrant officers Voloshin, Neshiyenko and others has enabled the crew to emerge from the most difficult trials of an ocean cruise with honor.

The success of a crew on a cruise and in combat depends on how harmoniously and efficiently all submariners act. The more masters in a crew, the quicker it attains combat harmony. It is natural that equipment maintenance quality is better, standards exceeded more assiduously, and combat training missions executed more successfully wherever a firm backbone of specialists with the highest rating has been formed. In such crews, combat morale is higher and competitiveness is more intense. After all, a master is not simply a skilled and able specialist. He is a person whose diligence and enthusiasm serve as an attractive example and moral standard for all sailors. He sets the tone in training and competition and others try to imitate him.

There is probably no military objective in the fleet where it is not understood that there has to be a persistent campaign to increase the number of masters. And yet at the same time, there are quite a few crews that have very few specialists with the highest rating and even none at all. Why? Primarily because an efficient system for this effort has not been organized everywhere, and poor planning and formalism still persist. Sometimes at the start of a training year, an extensive list of candidates for master is compiled, in the process, to designate the rate indicator, but then the matter is neglected.

Warrant Officer A. Berdyugin did not pass the tests for master within the planned period. At first glance, his failure was unexpected. Berdyugin is an experienced submariner and all were certain that he would surely become a master. And, having relied on the warrant officer himself, there was no serious training for him. No one monitored the warrant officer's individual training and nobody seriously helped him prepare for the tests. And after all, when there is a lack of attention on the part of the commanders and the collective as a whole, doubt would automatically arise in any person: does all this really mean anything to anyone save himself?

Success in the campaign to raise the rating of the crew with a combat rating depends largely on who goes to the tests. It is trained to this problem in the military collective. The rating of a "master" is not just a personal matter for a particular officer, a warrant officer. It is a matter that is very difficult to change. It depends on the training of the crew, and thus it is indeed a collective matter. And it is especially a collective matter in the case of warrant officers, staff organization and household officers. They are all called upon to create the atmosphere that makes the progress in having every officer and warrant officer master his specialty.

In promoting training for the crew, the staff organization and political officers get together. They begin with mass meetings, begin with mass meetings, work on officers, emphasize the experience of our masters and have the sailors get together with them in meetings. In a prominent place are hung the lists of those who have decided to become a master or confirm this title, and for immediate publicity the course of preparation for the tests. This course, — to speak, the prestige of the title of "master" in the eyes of the crew, and promotes an increase in the number of candidates competing to obtain it. And the moral support and the attention to the right-flankers increase their responsibility for assimilating the appropriate training programs.

Naturally though, moral support is not enough. There has to be specific help in training. It is immeasurably more difficult to reach the master level than any preceding one. And it is not just a question of mastering qualitatively higher knowledge and skills. Those preparing to attain the first levels of proficiency have the opportunity of doing this under the immediate supervision of the best experienced specialists in the crew. But who can help the future master? Who can teach him? After all, he himself as a rule is the most expert in his specialty on the ship.

This problem can be solved only by collective efforts, after setting up an efficient system of preparation for our tests on the scale of the whole unit. And that is just what we are trying to do. Classes are held regularly for the master candidates, conducted by the best department commanders and staff specialists, by those officers and warrant officers who are already masters of military affairs. The latter, by the way, have a special role. Each master looks after one of his comrades and brings him up to his own level.

Much can be done too, in our view, by the supervisory rating commissions set up in the unit. They used to get together right before the tests. Now they are set up in advance, and plans for their work are drafted beforehand, covering such questions as the explanation of requirements imposed during tests for master, holding of consultations, consultations, etc. All in all, there is someone to work with those who have resolved to become a specialist of a higher rating. It can be said confidently that people are not born masters and do not become masters in isolation; masters mature in a collective.

Of course, any class and any consultation has to be reinforced by persistent independent training. The conditions of serving on a ship are such that, for example, on a long cruise, the independent method of training (or the method of individual tasks) becomes primary when preparing for the tests. But does that mean that, while studying on one's own on a long cruise, a warrant officer or officer is inevitably left to his own resources? Of course not. For example, Warrant Officer A. Yegorushin went out on a cruise. He was given help ahead of time in compiling a detailed plan for independent training. Those tasks that would involve the warrant officer were thoroughly considered in the plan, and a detailed schedule was made for specifically when and which problem he had to work out. The subunit commander strictly monitored the warrant officer's execution of this plan. And Yegorushin did not fall behind his comrades who remained at the base; he was successfully prepared for the tests.

Attention to those officers and warrant officers striving to add to the number of higher rated specialists has to be continuous and comprehensive. For after all, there are still cases when a person passes the tests, and then through carelessness or indifference, someone "forgets" to fill out the forms on time to have him included in the appropriate order. Or, for example, a sailor prepares persistently for the attempt at the master level and strives to meet his pledge, and then at the most critical time, he is sent on leave or temporary duty. After all, it is just not that difficult to make up the leave schedule with consideration for whether or not a person is taking part in the tests. In our view, it is also not difficult to keep this in mind when assigning sailors to details, watches and ship duty. One has to persistently strive to see that the systematic training of master candidates is not interrupted and that their classes and consultations are not missed.

Naturally, I am not advocating granting them some special privileges. Ship conditions are the same for all, and each sailor has to bear his responsibilities conscientiously. But it should not be forgotten that concerns for increasing the number of masters are in the interests of the entire collective.

... Officers and warrant officers are training intensively, competing for the right to be designated a master of the combat rating. And it is very important to see that none of them is alone in their difficult assault on the heights of mastery.

(The young man is smiling.)

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is quoted in "Pravda" 20 p. 2

(Article by Captain 1st Rank A. Belikov, a navigator of the Baltic Fleet, twice awarded the Red Banner, in the column "Needed for the Fleet" "Accident-Free Navigation")

(Text) A ship returns from an ocean cruise. The captain is the first to step on shore and he reports to the senior master who is in the crew.

And to that I must also add that the "Neukrotimvy" did not report: "There were no incidents of lightning or other atmospheric phenomena." That will be fairly typical of any ship.

As for active navigation and combat readiness, too. The two concepts are closely related and always interconnected. They are inseparable from each other. What indeed was needed here? In the "Neukrotimvy," A. Shchekin, B. Gerasimov, B. Dubrovskiy, A. P. Dostoyevskiy, and others. B. Dubrovskiy, the most difficult aspect of navigation, and then, of course, the tactics. Absolutely. Tactics, tactical skill. Naturally. But at the same time, naval skill and navigational proficiency too, thanks to which the ships were unafraid of the whims of the weather, the whims of the time, the whims of the currents. And a certain attitude toward the quality of work, which enabled the sailors to achieve faultless operation of the most complex equipment.

The same is true of the position of the officers and crews. The "Neukrotimvy," incidentally, seemed to have been after a long period, its course was through regions very difficult for navigation. Time and again, the strength of the people and equipment was tried by raging storms. There were quite a few battles. Naturally, if the cruise when ever needed to double their efforts. But there were no situations that would surprise the sailors or for which they would not have been prepared in advance.

Gradually and more precisely became the law of the "Neukrotimvy." And the example here was set by the ship's captain, Captain 3rd Rank V. Korniyushko, winner of the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," 11 decorations.

As I look at the navigation log of the "Neukrotimvy," I note the starting point, where the ship "lost contact" with reliable, signal shore orientation features. Next to it is a column of figures, calculations for wind drift and currents, and a series of observations next to the lines of the computed course made by the navigator, Senior Lieutenant V. Kovalevskiy. But there is a different handwriting here too, that of Captain 3rd Rank Korniyushko. The same calculations, but made by him personally, shows how systematically the captain was supervising Kovalevskiy, how objectively he was teaching him, and how strictly he was requiring increased precision in his work.

Korniyushko devoted the same continuing attention on the cruise to the training of the watch officers and the team at the combat information post, the work of the signal watch and the crew, as the electromechanical subunit, in short, everything on which the reliability of navigation depended.

Navigational safety results from many things: the captain's calculation and sure eye, the crew's excellent actions when performing each maneuver, the punctuality in implementing the rules of navigating, a thorough consideration of weather conditions, and finally, the high culture in maintenance of

the ship and all equipment that ensures reliable movement, maneuverability, vigilant observation, efficient communication and precision of steering.

There are no trivial items in the campaign for accident-free navigation. Everything is important here.

One day, Captain-Lieutenant A. Nikokoshev received an order at headquarters to move his ship from one moorage to another. After returning from headquarters, Nikokoshev went to the bridge and, without even being concerned about whether or not the battle stations were ready for the transfer, gave the command to remove the lines. The result was a superfluous and unnecessary delay due to the captain's self-confidence: after all, time and again he had taken the ship on an ocean cruise, and this was just some shift of moorage. . . .

Such facts cause a feeling of annoyance. Not one mature navigator would ever violate the rules even in details. In my lieutenant years I had occasion to serve on the cruiser "Sverdlov" under Captain 1st Rank Ivan Sergeyevich Lapshin's command. I remember how surprised the other new officers and I were at first at the punctiliousness with which he prepared for each departure for sea.

During his long years of service, Lapshin got to know the waters of his home port like the palm of his hand. And, by the way, the whole Baltic too. Nevertheless, before weighing anchor he would refer to the chart every time and simulate on it beforehand the departure from port, all the possible alternatives of divergences from oncoming vessels, maneuvers, etc. I remember he had cut out a small ship from thick cardboard. This little ship used to get into the most severe messes on "cruises" over the chart. In return, the cruiser "Sverdlov" under Lapshin's command always sailed reliably, without accidents or breakdowns.

Ship regulations require thorough pre-cruise preparation before each departure for sea. This is the basis of the fundamentals of accident-free navigation. Considering this, our fleet headquarters is consistently implementing a number of measures aimed at preventing ship equipment breakdowns and navigation accidents. Much attention is paid to strict observance of international-legal norms and primarily to the punctual implementation of the International Rules for Preventing Collisions of Ships at Sea.

With the officers, we regularly conduct analyses of complex navigational situations on special plotting boards and demonstration moorings, towings and refuelings at sea. We organize navigation safety days and other measures to raise the naval and technical skill of the sailors.

Nevertheless, disappointing events are encountered once in a while. Why? In my view, because we not infrequently reduce everything to only solving purely technical and purely organizational problems. But the people called upon to implement what has been planned are sometimes, as it were,

relegated to the background. But in Soviet navigation safety begins first of all with the responsibility and individualism of each sailor. Much here depends on how well education is being reorganized in the collective and how actively the party and Komsomol organizations help the commander in the campaign for high skills of the crew.

Socialist competition ought to play a major role here. It should be recognized, however, that we still have a lot of formalism in this matter. Of course, no one forgets to make pledges, as a rule, in the campaign for no accidents. A specific stereotype of formulation has even been worked out: "To have no accidents or breakdowns within the training period." But after all, one can sail, so to speak, on the edge of risk, and one can treat the equipment negligently, and have no accidents or breakdowns for a certain time. It has to be recognized that we sometimes have such cases among "those who have met their pledges." It is evident that while defining the final goals clearly, at the same time, one has to get people to be concerned about not having any accidents both early and continually, and not evaluate their contribution to this matter irregularly.

One time I had the occasion to check out a ship on which Lieutenant L. Velikotray is serving. A quite clear period was designated for departure to sea. The officers were aware of this. However, for some reason they allowed themselves to show up late at the battle stations. Preparation for the cruise were made hastily and rules were violated. I had to resort to an extreme measure and forbade the departure. As it turned out, such events had happened here before too. But for some reason, not once had anyone been held strictly responsible for this.

Modern radars and navigational systems are practically trouble-free in operation. However, the newest means for ensuring sailing safety somehow have crowded out the old or, more correctly, traditional means. For example, the proven magnetic compass is now often not in operation. And what a negligent, condescending attitude has emerged toward it here and there. But recently a ship, on which Senior Lieutenant A. Kupriyanov is the navigator, ended up in a situation that required use of just the magnetic compass exclusively. And only thanks to the fact that all equipment on this ship, irrespective of whether or not it is often used, is carefully adjusted and ready for operation, did the sailors manage to come out of the difficult situation with honor.

But I did not cite this fact just to direct attention to this problem. From it, one should conclude that Senior Lieutenant Kupriyanov and his subordinates were not required to do anything unusual or exceptional. They are simply conscientious and responsible in their attitude toward their service duties. And conscientiousness and responsibility is precisely what guaranteed that no accident occurred.

In the fleet, we often speak of "reliability of sailing" instead of "accident-free sailing." There is considerable meaning in this. Only a really reliable crew can sail without accidents, incidents and breakdowns, one that is reliable at each link, from the seaman to the captain.

YOUNG OFFICERS: IMPROVING THEIR TEACHING METHODS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 80 signed to press
18 Jun 80 pp 29-35

[Article by Lt Gen Arty N. Mil'chenko, chief of staff of Order of Lenin
Moscow Air Defense District, under the heading "Questions of Training and
Military Indoctrination": "Firm Methods Skills for Young Officers";
passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] It is a great honor to be a Soviet officer. His duties are great and responsible. The Communist Party, Soviet government and our people entrusted him with an important state matter--the training and indoctrination of the Motherland's armed defenders and, if required, leading them into combat. The entire meaning of a Soviet officer's service activities consists of strengthening the combat readiness of the Armed Forces steadfastly. This obligates him to raise ideological-political conditioning persistently, to master Marxist-Leninist theory thoroughly, to perfect professional expertise day in and day out and to show constant concern for augmenting the grand traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The outfitting of troops with new, more sophisticated and more powerful combat equipment and weaponry and the change in methods of conducting combat operations determined a further intensification of the training-indoctrination process in units and made the task of preparing highly-qualified specialists more complex. In this regard there has been an increase in the demands placed on those entrusted with the training and indoctrination of personnel and on their political, military-theoretical and technical knowledge and their methods proficiency.

Methods proficiency is an officer's ability to make use of the sum total of techniques, methods and forms of training to teach subordinates to master weapons and equipment skillfully and weld them in compressed periods of time into a monolithic fighting collective capable of performing the mission assigned the subunit under any conditions. A commander's high methods proficiency permits an increase in the effectiveness of the training and indoctrination process, the shaping of necessary moral-political and psychological qualities in personnel and successful accomplishment of combat teamwork training of subunits and units. But a weak methods proficiency in a class

instructor inevitably leads to serious mistakes in the organization of combat and political training and socialist competition.

The graduates of military educational institutions have a special requirement for methods assistants. On arriving in troop units, they fervently begin work and attempt to serve the socialist homeland enthusiastically and to work with a full exertion of energy. Each of the young officers of course wishes to achieve high indicators both in personal combat training and in the training and indoctrination of subordinate privates and NCO's. But at first they lack experience in life, professional experience and firm methods skills and they encounter certain difficulties in performing official duties. The fact is that they are in charge of teams, platoons, companies and batteries. They personally conduct classes with subordinates and develop their moral-combat qualities and the ability to overcome the difficulties of military service. In the final account, the combat readiness of units and combined units depends on the effectiveness of their work. For this reason one can understand the reinforced attention by commanders and political workers at all levels to an improvement in the methods proficiency of the officer youth. In this regard we should recall the advice of V. I. Lenin. He pointed out that young people "have to be helped in every possible way, regarding their mistakes as patiently as possible and attempting to correct them gradually and chiefly through /persuasion.../" This statement by Vladimir Il'ich is an immutable rule in our work with young officers.

The basics of methods skills are laid down in schools, but the skills develop and are perfected throughout all troop service. Command training, and in particular such forms as training methods courses, demonstration classes, instructional methods classes, briefings, group exercises and short tactical training problems are a tested school for raising methods skills. Skills acquired during such training later are polished in combat practice, during classes, exercises, firings, missile launchings and flights, and while standing combat watch.

A principle proven in life is becoming more and more established in district troop units: The senior chief trains and indoctrinates his subordinate officers and is responsible for their preparation and service activities. Staffs are planning and conducting work of introducing young officers into formation as commanders, specialists and indoctrinators of their subordinates in a more well conceived and organized manner than previously.

The district military council reception of young officers who have just arrived from schools has become a good tradition. Talks by the district commander, military council member, commanders of combat arms and chiefs of services about the place, role and missions of the capital air defense district in the Armed Forces system, about its remarkable traditions and about features of service in our troop units introduce the lieutenants to a new situation which is uncommon to them. The warm reception and paternal exhortations and wishes of the senior personnel generate pride in the young officers that they are to serve in the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense

District and give them confidence in their own abilities and in the success of their chosen work.

Specific procedures have been established in the troop units for preparing and authorizing the officers for performance of duties and independent standing of combat watch. The units and combined units have arranged special training methods courses and specialty practices. Staffs take an active part in preparing and conducting these activities. The courses are for studying foremost techniques of training and indoctrinating personnel, fundamentals of combat employment of weapons and equipment, procedures for preparing and holding tactical exercises and field firings and so on. The courses conclude with tests.

Demonstration classes play an important role in perfecting the officers' methods training. They contribute to attainment of a uniformity of views on the organization and methodology of training, to assimilation of new techniques of combat operations and the employment of weapons and equipment, and to mastery of foremost experience. Demonstration classes usually are held on the most complex topics or on individual questions involving the training and indoctrination of personnel for which uniform guidelines must be given. Experience attests that demonstration classes with officers must be held not only on training program topics, but also on other matters involving the practical performance of duties as platoon and company commanders. Attention is required, for example, by such matters as subunit personnel actions in response to a combat alert and in performing an operational training mission, the procedures for preparing soldiers to go on guard duty and others. It stands to reason that the demonstration classes must carry the most advanced methods for training and indoctrinating soldiers into the officer masses and contribute to the practical adoption among the troops of the latest achievements in military pedagogics.

In order to master the art of fighting under conditions of modern warfare, officer personnel must have a clear idea of what to teach subordinates and how and which techniques and methods of training are best to use. The young officers receive a significant portion of this knowledge and skills in instructional methods classes. Here they deepen their theoretical understanding, reinforce practical skills in training and indoctrinating subordinates and receive answers to many questions troubling them. In contrast to demonstration classes, this form of methods training envisages the officers' direct participation in working training problems both as trainees--privates and NCO's---and in the role of commander--the class instructor.

Some units conduct briefing sessions with young officers. This is done in those instances where a need arises to go over briefly with one or more officers the content of the next combat training topic, show them methods for working individual questions, and give instructions on logistical support for the upcoming class.

The young officers' attendance at classes being held by experienced commanders and their participation in methods conferences and scientific

methods conferences for discussing the organization of classes and the experience of preparing training off-techniki and rated specialists plays a significant role in improving their pedagogic expertise along with the aforementioned training forms. Such conferences discuss theoretical articles published in the periodical military press, reports and papers of a training methods character, and other materials.

Unit training methods councils give direct assistance to the lieutenants and to those recently promoted in improving methods schooling. They do much to seek out, generalize and adopt into practice contemporary techniques for training and indoctrinating soldiers. But we also often encounter an instance where training methods councils engage in elaborating the appropriate matters in general, without taking a differentiated approach to the young officers. The work of the unit training methods council invariably must be directed and monitored by the commander and staff. Herein lies an important reserve for increasing the combat schooling of all categories of officers.

An officer's ability to take advantage of the mobilizing force of socialist competition is an indicator of his methods maturity. The experience of foremost subunits confirms that the effectiveness of classes and practice sessions arises when the practice of norms and perfection of the soldiers' practical skills are arranged in a competitive spirit and results are compared with indicators of preceding classes and socialist pledges which have been made. All young officers have to be trained in this. At the same time, they must be taught to make skilled use of the training facility. A majority of district units devote sufficient attention to this important question, but there are instances where trainers, mock-ups and visual aids are not used to the full extent in classes.

It should be emphasized that successful development of young officers depends largely on how they themselves display persistence in augmenting their knowledge, how they overcome difficulties and how they organize independent work, primarily for the detailed study of the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, materials of the 25th CPSU Congress and subsequent Party Central Committee plenums, and works and speeches by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The more an officer's independent work is subordinated to the interests and tasks of combat and political training and socialist competition, the higher its effectiveness. Any person who counts on success needs to have high personal efficiency, persistence and punctuality. At the same time, this success also depends on the senior chief. They are called upon to direct the young officers' self-education more concretely, give the necessary direction to their efforts, assist them, suggest optimum methods for independent work and monitor its results. On the advice of senior comrades, many young officers have begun to draw up personal plans. These plans define specifically what they should study, by what dates, when to train in working with weapons and instruments, when to study equipment and armaments of foreign armies, what to do during hours of scheduled independent training and what to do on their own time.

The independent training of officers in some district units is reflected in class schedules showing not only the time, but also where and on what the officers are obligated to work during these hours. In a number of instances there are provisions for performing individual assignments, preparing for tests and so on. Such an approach to organizing independent training systematizes the work of young officers and makes it more productive, which has a positive effect on their command development and professional growth.

Unfortunately, it is not in all district units and subunits that lieutenants encounter sympathetic, warm and comradely attention and at the same time a fundamental, exacting attitude toward themselves on the part of experienced officers. The fate of Lt V. Besserezhnev is an example. There was essentially no one who handled the development of a young officer in the unit in which he arrived to serve. The blame for this lies with the unit command element and, of course, the staff officers. Here they reconciled themselves with reassigning this important matter to acting battery commander Lt V. Pello.

It might appear at first glance that the mistake was easily corrected. But an analysis of the state of affairs in the collective performed by a group of district staff officers revealed a well-established faulty practice of taking an indifferent attitude toward young officers. All this in the final account could not help but lead to serious consequences. The low level of methods training of recent school graduates entailed a weakening of the indoctrinational work among NCO's, which was the reason for instances of infractions of military discipline. The unit command element did not delve deeply into the service activities of young officers and so was not able to take timely steps to keep them from making mistakes. The leaders apparently assumed that after assigning yesterday's cadet to a position, it remained only to demand an accounting of him in all severity.

Severity and exactingness are of course needed. The Army tenor of life is inconceivable without this. But high exactingness has nothing in common with unjustified disciplinary punishments or excessive haste in imposing them. And in the unit in question the highest percentage of punishments involved lieutenants and senior lieutenants. But it is well known that any extremity is harmful in indoctrinational work.

The district military council did not ignore the status of indoctrinational work in this unit. Its session heard reports from its commander and political department chief. It was explained to them once again that a let-up in management of subordinates is incompatible with the demand of the times to reinforce combat readiness in every possible way or with the party demand to bring up the Soviet citizen in a spirit of selfless service for the good of our socialist Motherland. It is hoped that the discussion in the military council will be of benefit to the commander, political workers and staff officers of the unit. They will draw proper conclusions and will change the style of their work in indoctrinating personnel, including officers who are recent military school graduates.

The... who are developed... it is impossible... for... matter... fact... in indo-... military

... [SAR]... with... position... equipment... His... the proper... Shashikyan... moment... feelings... remain silent... the discussion with the committee

... of equipment... in this area... an... the officers. And... people and their...

The... a commander... the... They also... which the... did not make... worked daily... his abundant... taught him where... use personal...

... work... carefully... and reinforce... he proceeds in... The... the periodic press and

television broadcasts. He reads much fiction and sociopolitical literature. He takes clippings from newspapers and extracts from books and collects examples and facts from the television programs "Time," "I Serve the Soviet Union!", "The World Today" and others. He then uses all this material during classes.

The officer also proceeds in this manner in classes in tactical, special and other forms of combat training. The young commander skillfully employs those training techniques which most graphically demonstrate the interworking of assemblies and mechanisms and he makes an attempt to explain more intelligibly a particular technical device.

The young officer arranges his work with subordinates on his time off and in hours of political indoctrination work in an interesting manner. All this adds to his authority. Not long ago the subunit's party members elected Sr Lt Kazvanin deputy secretary of the primary party organization. This is high trust for the young officer. He values this and seeks opportunities for further activation of the work of the battalion's party organization.

Finally, to complete the portrait of the officer, we cannot pass over the fact that Sr Lt Kazvanin became the example for all young commanders thanks to the persistent, painstaking improvement in his proficiency. Lt V. Solodkiy, a 1979 school graduate who arrived for service in the battery, received reliable support and assistance from senior comrades.

The examples given from the two units are very indicative. It is above all the fact that where primary importance is attached to matters of improving officers' methods proficiency, where recent school graduates are surrounded with concern and attention, and where the work with them is not neglected, tangible results are attained both in the indoctrination of highly skilled command cadres and in the effective, high-quality accomplishment of combat and political training missions and in increasing combat readiness.

An officer of the USSR Armed Forces is a Soviet manager and a Soviet specialist. The entire process of preparing officers presumes the development in them of qualities which meet the demands the party places on management cadres. Comrade Brezhnev states that "the Soviet specialist today is a person who has mastered the principles of Marxist-Leninist training work, who clearly sees the political goals of the party and country, who has extensive scientific and practical training and who has mastered his specialty to perfection."

"The Soviet specialist today is a capable organizer who is able to apply principles of scientific organization of labor in practice. He is able to work with people, values collective experience, heeds his comrades' opinions and makes a critical appraisal of what has been achieved."

"And finally, the contemporary specialist is a person of high culture, of extensive erudition. In general, he is a real intellectual of a new, socialist society."

The military units are doing their best to improve the quality of their work. It is only just now that the military units which will allow complete implementation of the Party and the Government's plan for the development of the Armed Forces.

The military units are doing their best to improve the quality of their work. It is only just now that the military units which will allow complete implementation of the Party and the Government's plan for the development of the Armed Forces.

They have a deep conviction that they are responsible for performing their duty and for improving the quality of their work. It is only just now that the military units which will allow complete implementation of the Party and the Government's plan for the development of the Armed Forces.

The effectiveness of the work is being improved by the military units. It is only just now that the military units which will allow complete implementation of the Party and the Government's plan for the development of the Armed Forces.

It is a categorical that the party members are doing this work. This is a credit to the political departments of the staff and directorates, which directly direct the work of the military units. It is only just now that the military units which will allow complete implementation of the Party and the Government's plan for the development of the Armed Forces.

attempt to help party members be genuine party fighters and bring them up as leaders of the masses.

The experience of the party organization of the combat training department is typical in this regard. It constantly maintains a focus on problems of improving the professional and methods proficiency of class instructors and adoption into practice of the models of military work and foremost techniques of indoctrinating and training soldiers. These questions are discussed regularly at meetings of party members and at party bureau sessions. Decisions made there are persistently implemented. Explaining, showing, teaching and then checking and demanding implementation of their recommendations--that is the work style of leading officer-party members, and not only of the combat training department, but of the entire staff and all district directorates.

Young officers are the future of our Army. To develop their pride in belonging to the Soviet officer corps and their desire to cherish military honor and justify the high calling of armed defender of the Land of Soviets and the homeland of the October Revolution through faultless service, and to arm them with detailed political, military and technical knowledge and firm professional and methods skills means to make a tangible contribution to raising the quality of combat and political training and to a further strengthening of combat readiness of the valorous Soviet Armed Forces.

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COMMAND TRAINING: SEMINAR CONTENTS DESCRIBED

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[Article for seminar class in the command training system: "Pedagogic Proficiency and Ways of Improving It"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The activities of commanders, political workers and all officers in training and indoctrinating personnel are complex and many-sided. The combat readiness and combat effectiveness of units and subunits depends on their goal-oriented activities to a decisive extent. USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov notes that "officer cadres play . . . the chief role in development of the Soviet soldier. Their profession is responsible and honorable. The Motherland has entrusted them with her dearest possession--our remarkable youth, whom they must train in military affairs, indoctrinate and, when it should be necessary, lead into battle."

There probably is no sector of military service where an officer does not act as a propagandist of the party's ideas, as the teacher and indoctrinator of subordinates and as a political instructor. Moreover, numerous studies and work experience indicate that the pedagogic function occupies one of the leading places in his complex and many-sided work. Successes in combat and political training, in making the military collective cohesive, in maintaining regulation order and in ensuring appropriate combat readiness depend largely on how well an officer has been trained as an expert in training and indoctrinating soldiers. A seminar class in the command training system on the topic "The Officer's Pedagogic Proficiency and Ways of Improving It in the Unit or Aboard Ship," which is the final class in the course of military pedagogy and psychology, is devoted to a discussion of these current problems. The requirements for its preparation and for the methodology of discussing primary issues also stem from this feature.

It is recommended that the following basic problems be examined in the class for a four-hour period: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on requirements placed on officer cadres. 2. The essence, structure and content of the Soviet officer's pedagogic proficiency. 3. Fundamental directions for improving pedagogic proficiency.

A more detailed and comprehensive examination of the topic requires the use of training material on the substance of all past classes, i.e., knowledge of the structure and content of the psychology of the personality of the soldier and the military collective, of the individual and social-psychological features of different categories of service personnel, and of the patterns, principles, forms and methods of training and indoctrination. It is therefore desirable that students refer to the literature on all these problems in the process of preparing for the seminar session.

Each category of indoctrinators examines the questions posed primarily from the standpoint of their specific activities. At the same time, it is also necessary to remember the integrated approach to covering the problems being discussed and to be concerned with examples illustrating the fruits of joint organizational endeavors of commanders, political workers, engineering-technical personnel, and party and Komsomol organizations.

The instructor's introductory remarks briefly set forth the heightened requirements on psychological-pedagogic preparation of officer cadres under present-day conditions and specific requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, name the primary issues in the lesson plan, and define procedures for discussing them. The idea is emphasized that an officer's pedagogic proficiency is manifested not in individual moments or episodes, but throughout the many-sided indoctrinational work with personnel, which plays a very important role in raising the level of combat and political training, in rallying military collectives and in strengthening discipline, order and efficiency.

In revealing the /first/ question, primary attention is focused on the psychological-pedagogic training of indoctrinators, and above all on Leninist provisions and requirements of the party's guidance documents in this area. The works of Lenin set forth thoroughly and in detail the fundamental provisions on requirements placed on officer cadres, on the style, principles and methods of their activities, and on the content of training and indoctrination with consideration of features of people.

In his work entitled "On the Blending of Politics with Pedagogics," Lenin remarked: "There always is and will be a certain element of pedagogics in the political activities of the Social-Democratic Party." At the same time, Vladimir Il'ich pointed to the subordination of pedagogic endeavors to political goals and tasks. He viewed indoctrination as a social phenomenon. Leninist principles of training and indoctrinating personnel stem from the social character of indoctrination.

Lenin's works set forth requirements placed on qualities of officers in the new army and on their work style--requirements stemming from general demands placed on management cadres. The most important of them is a knowledge of people and the ability to approach and understand the masses. Inherent to the indoctrinator is exactingness toward subordinates, concern for them, an excellent knowledge of military affairs, political competence, industriousness, resolve, courage, competency and a number of other qualities.

It is also advisable to examine the officer's demands on psychological-pedagogic training of specialists in a close link with Leninist provisions. Materials of party congresses and CPSU IX stresses regularly emphasize the need for all managers to master knowledge in the field of pedagogics and psychology. In describing the party's demands on cadres at the 25th party congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev remarked: "A contemporary manager must organically combine a party spirit with deep competency, and discipline with initiative and an imaginative approach to work. At the same time, a manager in any sector is obligated to consider the social-political and indoctrination aspects, to be sensitive to people and to their needs and desires, and serve as an example in work and everyday life."

Brezhnev's works and speeches and his books "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" [The Rebirth] and "Tsolina" [The Virgin Lands] serve as an important source of psychological-pedagogic knowledge. They demonstrate intelligibly, clearly and in specific examples the role and place of pedagogic activities of managers, commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol activists.

At the conclusion of discussion of the first question, one must dwell briefly on an analysis of regulation provisions and the demands of other evidence documents for the psychological-pedagogic preparation of officer cadres and different categories of officials, making this conform with the specific features of the students.

Discussion of the /second/ question should begin with a determination of the capabilities, knowledge, skills and abilities needed by the indoctrinator and which permit the successful training and indoctrination of subordinates.

Qualities of personality are a very important precondition and the basis of an officer's pedagogic proficiency. Psychological-pedagogic literature identifies the following groups of these qualities:

1. Ideological-political (communist conviction, patriotism, internationalism, hatred for enemies of the Motherland, party principle and so on);
2. Moral and moral-combat qualities (honesty, truthfulness, modesty, collectivism, discipline, resolve, persistence, boldness and a number of others);
3. Organizational qualities (good management, competency, efficiency and others);
4. Strictly pedagogic qualities (pedagogic erudition, pedagogic powers of observation, pedagogic tact and techniques, pedagogic imagination and thinking and others).

The sum total of these qualities form a unique portrait of the Soviet officer as a military teacher.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of personality qualities for successful pedagogic activities. Lenin emphasized that "a living example acts more than any proclamations or conferences..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXV, 278).

The example is based on the natural psychological phenomenon of emulation. Young people beginning service who do not have abundant experience in life attempt to act and behave as do their senior comrades, commanders and chiefs. From this comes the requirement on indoctrinators to be the example for subordinates always and in everything and to conduct themselves so as to generate in those around them the desire for emulation.

On the other hand, an indoctrinator's high personality qualities are a necessary precondition for successful management of the military collective. For example, if an officer does not have a broad general and technical outlook, if he is burdened by painstaking work with people, if he is too severe or lacks the ability to organize, or if he is inaccessible to subordinates, all this will have a negative effect in one way or another on the results of his indoctrinational efforts.

During the session it is advisable to use specific examples to examine the content of all fundamental qualities and the nature of their effect on the pedagogic work of military cadres. One should dwell in more detail on the description of pedagogic powers of observation, pedagogic tact, pedagogic technique, pedagogic imagination, thinking, speech and other qualities of the officer-teacher in their relationship with the results of training and indoctrination work.

In principle such concepts as powers of observation, imagination, thinking and speech are well known to the student. But labeling them as "pedagogic" introduces a substantially new content to them. For example, in contrast to conventional and everyday powers of observation, so to speak, pedagogic powers of observation are characterized by purposefulness, precise practical direction, effectiveness and a planned nature. In observing subordinates' actions and deeds, an officer studies them in different kinds of endeavor, rechecks the data obtained many times, clarifies the information by other methods of study and, most important, introduces corrections to the training and indoctrination process and analyzes the effectiveness of techniques and means used for this.

Pedagogic tact is an important quality of an officer. This is a certain moderation in relationships with subordinates: Just exactingness without loud shouting and humiliations; firmness and good management without swearing and lack of organization; respect without servility and allowances; nearness to people and concern for them without connivance and familiarity, and so on.

In other words, in building his relationships with subordinates, comrades and seniors in any sphere of endeavor, an officer is obligated to act at all times in conformity with pedagogic tact. In this instance his influence on subordinates will be more productive.

Seminar participants' attention also should be directed to an important trait of the instructor and indoctrinator such as pedagogic technique. A. S. Makarenko, who had mastered it, said: "I became a genuine master only when I learned to say 'come here' with 15-20 inflections and when I learned to give 20 nuances in composing my face, figure and voice" ("Sochineniya" [Works], Vol. 5, 1958, p. 269). An officer's capable use of his expressive abilities (voice training, gestures, mimicry and so on) permits a more subtle influence on the psychology of the individual soldiers and attainment of a greater indoctrinational effect.

For example, all officers know well from practical experience how an order is issued: laconically, clearly, and distinctly in a voice tolerating no objections and generating no doubts. An officer's ordinary manner of speaking should be completely different: a confidential tone and a voice with numerous intonations (optimism, advice, doubt and so on) depending on the situation. Mimicry, gestures and posture also are different here.

The opinion exists that all this comes naturally to the indoctrinator and when something is not given, then allegedly this deficiency cannot be corrected. Of course, some traits of people which contribute to pedagogic activity are hereditary. But this does not at all mean that if they are lacking or insufficiently developed, they cannot be developed. Experience indicates that one can achieve great results with purposeful, capable and persistent work on oneself.

It is fully understandable that qualities of personality alone are far from sufficient for successful indoctrinational activities. Knowledge is an important element in the structure of an officer's pedagogic proficiency. Without sufficient erudition there is not and cannot be a good specialist in any field. It is fully understandable that the most thorough preparedness is required for pedagogic work where a human is the subject.

Lenin emphasized that "...in order to control, one must be competent, one must know all conditions of production fully and down to the fine points, one must know the technology of this production at its contemporary level, and one must have a certain education" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XI, 215).

The character and content of an officer's knowledge are determined above all by his assignment. A commander (chief) manages, trains and indoctrinates subordinates. Consequently, he must be a politically trained person and must possess broad cultural and technical horizons and have a good knowledge of his own specialty and of military affairs as a whole. And of course, as a military teacher an officer is obligated to have sufficient understanding in the field of psychology and pedagogics.

In the system used for arming officer cadres with political, special and psychological-pedagogic knowledge, special attention is given to the ideological and methodological training of the indoctrinators, which permits solving all training and indoctrination problems in a skilled and

high-quality manner. For example, from the standpoint of such an approach in the study of military pedagogics and psychology, primary attention is focused on clarifying the principles of the military-pedagogic process, the principles and methods of training and indoctrinating personnel, the principles of developing the personality of the Soviet soldier and military collective and a number of other problems. Their precise clarification provides for a deep understanding of the nature and specifics of training service personnel and permits an imaginative approach to the quest for effective forms and methods of work and generalization of everything new and foremost.

Meanwhile, even if an officer has all necessary personality qualities and abundant, diversified knowledge, it still is impossible to speak of a genuinely high pedagogic proficiency. Lenin emphasized that "no school or university is worthwhile if there is no practical ability" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XLII, 77). Skills and abilities thus also act as a necessary structural element of an officer's pedagogic proficiency. Skills are the simplest automated actions, but abilities are more complex and are brought to reality under diverse, changing conditions.

It is customary to single out in an officer's pedagogic activities the skills and abilities in training and the skills and ability in indoctrination work. During the session it is advisable to dwell in more detail on these structural elements of pedagogic proficiency.

The students' attention should be focused in the /third/ question on examining fundamental directions in improving officers' pedagogic proficiency in the unit and aboard ship.

Officers obtain their initial experience in pedagogic work during training in military schools. The entire military-pedagogic process in universities, sociopolitical practice, and the study of courses on party-political work and the fundamentals of military psychology and pedagogics contribute to the graduates' development as political instructors, propagandists, teachers and indoctrinators of their subordinates. But only the fundamentals of pedagogic proficiency develop in universities. The true art of indoctrination is acquired in practical work. The entire process of combat and political training is essentially a most important condition for accelerated development of the young officer in a unit or aboard ship in this regard. Training and indoctrination of soldiers directly in the unit or aboard ship, and field, air and naval schooling of the personnel above all is a complicated and creative matter. It gives university graduates unlimited capabilities for improving their pedagogic proficiency. It is of course important that this process not be left to drift, but that it be controlled. This presumes first of all the assurance of personal example set by senior chiefs in performance of their duties and in an imaginative attitude toward training and indoctrination work. "Do as I do" is the work motto of experienced indoctrinators in the Army and Navy. Secondly, the art of officer-indoctrinators is enriched during specially arranged activities for teaching them the forms and methods of arming subordinates with military and political knowledge. These may be scheduled classes in the

system of command and Marxist-Leninist training, demonstration classes, instructional classes and so on.

Goal-oriented party-political work and the carefully planned activity of party organizations greatly contributes to an improvement in officers' pedagogic proficiency. Their contribution is especially perceptible in giving practical assistance to young officers.

Generalization of foremost experience is one of the most important directions in increasing the indoctrinators' pedagogic proficiency. As practical experience shows, the most widespread forms and methods of such work are practical science conferences, instructional methods classes, special conferences and seminars, and a summarization of results of combat and political training and of socialist competition. High quality in conducting these activities is a guarantee of further improvement of officers' pedagogic proficiency.

Is this taken into account everywhere? Unfortunately not. For example, in exercises critiques attention is usually on digital data characterizing particular changes in the personnel's combat schooling, and upcoming tasks for individual specialists, combat teams and sections are updated, but at times unjustifiably little is said about the pedagogic experience of various categories of indoctrinators--officers, junior commanders and the party-Komsomol aktiv. The very same thing sometimes occurs in service conferences. In the process, more of an accounting is demanded of the indoctrinators for omissions and it is not always learned just how the officers are working with people, which of them achieved success and by what means, which of them made mistakes for what reasons, and what methods, forms, means and techniques of training and indoctrination an officer did not succeed in applying.

Supervision and a subsequent critique of activities conducted in the subunit greatly contribute to an improvement in officers' pedagogic proficiency. Effectiveness of an analysis is heightened if a senior chief thoroughly goes into positive points in a subordinate's practice and at the same time points out his shortcomings in a fundamental and tactical manner. It is with this approach that an officer acquires confidence in his abilities and the desire to improve further. Peremptory shouting, undeserved reproaches, let alone dressings down, insults and humiliations, which are rare but are encountered in practice, do clear harm to the cause of indoctrination. They attest to poor pedagogic culture of the instructor and insufficient respect for the junior comrade's person. Comrade Brezhnev expressed himself well on this account in the book "Malaya Zemlya." He writes, "The habit of raising one's voice to people which, although not widespread, still is retained by some, is deeply reprehensible to me. Neither the administrative nor the party leader must forget that his subordinates are only subordinates in service, and they are not serving a director or manager, but the cause of the party and state. And all are equal in this respect. Those who allow themselves to deviate from this truth, which is immutable for our system, hopelessly compromise themselves and lose their authority. Yes, one who commits an infraction must bear responsibility: party, administrative or, finally, legal--any kind. But in no instance can we infringe on the self-esteem of people or belittle their dignity."

Such forms of raising officers' psychological-pedagogic and methods culture as pedagogic lecture groups and young officer days are widespread in units and aboard ships.

An important direction for improving the indoctrinators' proficiency is their independent work. Its essence reduces to the study of appropriate literature, a critical analysis of their own experience, and the desire to adopt everything new and foremost in the training and indoctrination practice.

A certain amount of experience in psychological-pedagogic training has been gained in every unit and aboard every ship. It is advisable for students to turn to this experience in examining ways and means for raising pedagogic proficiency and to use examples from their own practice.

A clear understanding by all students of the requirements for psychological-pedagogic culture of military cadres and perception of the need for constant improvement of the military teacher's qualities must be the result of a discussion of the class topic. Herein lies the guarantee of their effective indoctrinational influence on their subordinates and mobilization of the forces and energy of every soldier for successful accomplishment of missions facing the subunit, unit or ship personnel.

The instructor summarizes results of the session after discussion of the main issues. In particular, he draws a conclusion on the depth and quality with which problems in question have been revealed. Where necessary, the instructor explains once again the most complicated and poorly assimilated questions. A general grade is given for the seminar session and for presentations of all students.

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NORTHERN GROUP OF FORCES: SOVIET-POLISH TIES DESCRIBED

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[Article by Col A. Migunov, Chief of Agitprop Department, deputy chief of Political Directorate of Northern Group of Forces, under the heading "Work of Political Entities and Party Organizations": "In a Single Combat Formation"]

[Text] Ideas of socialist internationalism have become a firm part of the life and awareness of Soviet citizens. Lenin wrote that "we are internationalists." Our party never separated the destiny of the first socialist state in the world from the destinies of other countries and nations. It proceeds in its work from the fundamental international interests of socialism and the entire international revolutionary movement. For this reason it always has given and continues to give primary importance to the development of qualities of patriots-internationalists in Soviet citizens and in Army and Navy personnel.

Taking guidance from instructions of the 25th CPSU Congress, demands of the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," and recommendations of the Army and Navy command-political conference, which pointed out the need for further reinforcement of patriotic and international indoctrination of soldiers, the commanders, political entities and party organizations of the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) are concerned with seeing that the international indoctrination of people bears a complex character. It is viewed as one of the chief components of soldiers' moral-political training and an important means for shaping the combat qualities needed by the defender of the socialist homeland.

NGF soldiers temporarily located on the territory of the Polish People's Republic are striving to perform their patriotic and international duty worthily. They are linked with soldiers of the Polish Army by a firm friendship, the sources of which extend into the depths of history. Tens of thousands of Poles fought actively for the victory of October in Russia. The Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment was among the Polish revolutionary units which were a part of the Red Army during the Civil War, and it covered itself with

unfading glory. V. I. Lenin gave a speech to the soldiers of this regiment setting off for the front on 2 August 1918. He said that the regiment's fighting men "had been given the great honor to defend sacred ideas with guns in hand and . . . implement the international brotherhood of nations in fact."

The combat cooperation strengthened even more during World War II, when Polish patriots also fought fearlessly against Hitler's invaders shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet people and their Armed Forces.

NGF soldiers, like all Soviet citizens, sincerely cherish friendship with the workers and soldiers of the PNR [Polish People's Republic] and are making their contribution toward strengthening it.

Questions of international indoctrination of the personnel are regularly examined at sessions of the Group's military council, in the political directorate, in political entities, in party and Komsomol organizations and at sessions of garrison councils for strengthening Soviet-Polish friendship and combat cooperation.

All forms of ideological-indoctrination work are used to explain to service personnel, workers and employees the Leninist ideas of socialist internationalism and the course taken by the CPSU and Soviet government toward strengthening the economic, political and military cooperation of countries of the socialist community. Special attention is given to an explanation and propaganda of the international essence of the Warsaw Pact, the 25th Anniversary of which was celebrated this year, and to the commonality of goals and missions of building socialism and communism and of collective defense of revolutionary achievements.

The party organization where Maj V. Gar'kavenko is one of the party committee members performs much work aimed at international indoctrination of the personnel. It has drawn up a long-range plan which includes lectures, briefings and discussions on Leninist ideas, the essence of proletarian internationalism and combat cooperation of armies of socialist countries. The plan provides for presentations on the experience of joint operations by patriots-internationalists of different countries against the enemies of socialism. The attention of soldiers serving on the territory of the PNR is focused on a knowledge of the exploits of Soviet and Polish patriots who fought shoulder to shoulder against Hitler's occupiers during the Great Patriotic War.

Joint evenings of Soviet-Polish friendship and combat cooperation were held in connection with the 25th Anniversary of the Warsaw Pact. A delegation of Polish comrades was hosted by Soviet soldiers. The delegation was headed by Tadeusz (Gulyarovskiy), chairman of the city board of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society. He gave a report on the work of the society and prospects for further strengthening of friendship and cooperation.

workshops of improving international individualism are discussed in cell "B" in sessions of the party committee and at party aktiv meetings. This work is performed in a close tie with the local Polish-Soviet Friendship Society, leaders of local enterprises and Polish Army representatives. Officer party members I. Chernikov, P. Reshetnikov and R. Saytulinov take an active part in the propaganda work and in joint activities. They give lectures and briefings at Polish enterprises and in military units and arrange evenings of combat cooperation and an exchange of training experience among Soviet and Polish soldiers.

The local Komsomol organizations make no small contribution to the internationalization of personnel, under the direction of party organizations. For example, the Komsomol collective headed by Capt A. Vavilin conducts this work purposefully. Joint topical evenings and morning gatherings, sports competitions, tours and excursions to places of combat glory of the Soviet Armed Forces and the Polish Army, contests for best performers, singing songs, and an exchange of amateur concerts--all this has become a firm part of the Komsomol work practice.

At the initiative of Komsomol members there are contests for experts on the history of armies and states of the socialist community. Great interest is generated by literary evenings on works of Soviet poets and writers conducted with the participation of our Komsomol activists in Polish Army units and in Polish enterprises and schools. In the process our friends improve their knowledge of the Russian language and become more familiar with the socialist land, its heroic history, culture, art, customs of USSR nations and sources of the indestructible Soviet-Polish friendship.

At the present time the Group's party organizations are conducting work to familiarize the personnel with decisions of the recent 8th PZPR Congress, which developed a program for further national economic and social development.

Presentations by workers of party and state entities and lecturers of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society and of other PNR social organizations generate lively interest among our soldiers. Tours are held through places of Lenin in Poland, to industrial enterprises and construction sites, to rural production cooperatives and state farms, and to Soviet Army battlefields during the Great Patriotic War.

The Polish people sacredly revere the exploits of Soviet soldiers who brought to their long-suffering land freedom, happiness and a release from fascist slavery. Thousands of Soviet soldiers died the death of the brave in fighting for the liberation of Poland. Monuments have been erected throughout Poland to the liberating heroes.

For example, residents of the Polish village of Gerasimowicz, where during the Great Patriotic War Party Member Grigoriy Kunavin threw himself on an enemy machinegun and ensured success of the attacking company at the cost of his own life, decided to perpetuate his memory at a rural gathering.

The decree they adopted stated: "We lift up the name of Russian soldier Grigoriy Kunavin as a banner of the great brotherhood of the Russian and Polish peoples." As a sign of gratitude to the Soviet soldier-liberator, a general meeting of residents of the village of Gerasimowiczki decreed: to enter his name forever in the list of the village's honorary citizens; to hew his name on a marble slab; to give Grigoriy Kunavin's name to the school; and for teachers to begin the first lesson in the first class each year with a tale about the soldier-hero and his comrades whose blood gained the right of happiness and freedom for Polish children.

Residents of Sandomierz named the city's central street for Col Vasilii Skopenko, who distinguished himself in fighting for its liberation. One of the squares of the city of Wragrowiec bears the name of frontlinesman Col Peshkov. In the cities and villages of Poznan Province alone there are 23 streets and squares which bear the names of Soviet soldier-liberators, cosmonauts, writers and scientists.

Together with PNR soldiers, our soldiers set up mass meetings and rallies and organize wreath-layings at the tombs of heroes at the monuments perpetuating the exploits of Soviet patriots in the Great Patriotic War and on streets and squares named in their honor.

Meetings with production leaders of Polish factories and plants, with veterans of the revolutionary movement, with participants of fighting against the fascist German invaders, with former concentration camp prisoners and with figures of culture and the arts contribute to the international indoctrination of our service personnel.

The conduct of joint activities to strengthen combat cooperation among Soviet and Polish soldiers during tactical exercises, camp assemblies, field firings, competitions and day-to-day troop practice has entered the system. There is a mutual exchange of experience in combat and political training. There are meetings of commanders, political workers and soldiers of different specialties. They share experience in servicing equipment, organizing socialist competition and performing operational training missions. It is the practice to hold joint days off, athletic activities and an exchange of amateur art groups.

Soviet and Polish soldiers hold typical evening gatherings: "V. I. Lenin on Defense of the Achievements of Socialism," "We are to Defend Socialism and Communism Together" and "The Friendship of Brother Nations Grows Strong."

Activities devoted to banner events and jubilee dates in the life of the Soviet and Polish peoples have become traditional. Delegations from NGF units are invited to enterprises on the anniversary of the Great October and on Soviet Army and Navy Day. Soviet soldiers tell the enterprise toilers about achievements in building communism and about the grand combat path of the Soviet Armed Forces. For their part, Soviet soldiers cordially receive leaders, workers and soldiers of the fraternal country on the anniversary of the formation of the PNR and the Polish People's Army.

There is a relay of friendship with the participation of Soviet and Polish soldiers on jubilee dates of the two fraternal Armies. Its participants meet with veterans of the struggle against fascism and with workers, peasants, and party and public figures. Relay routes often pass through places of Lenin in Poland.

Trips to places of Lenin were arranged during days of preparations for celebration of the 110th Anniversary of the great leader's birth. During the trips Soviet soldiers and members of servicemen's families had an opportunity to become more familiar with the local populace, with the national customs, traditions and history of Poland, with achievements of the Polish People's Republic in building socialism, and with prospects for its social, economic and cultural development. Residents of Poland for their part gained a better understanding of Soviet citizens.

A practical science conference of leaders of the Northern Group of Forces and the Slask Military District of the Polish People's Army was held on the eve of the 110th Anniversary of Lenin's birth on the topic "Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland and its embodiment in the practical work of the CPSU and PZRP." Lt Gen N. Lashchchenko, member of military council and chief of political directorate of the Group of Forces, gave a briefing on this topic.

Ant. B. Milszorek, chief of political directorate of the Slask Military District, gave the briefing entitled "V. I. Lenin on the international character of defense of socialism and the 8th PZRP Congress on further strengthening of military-political cooperation of socialist countries." Here SU Col Gen Yu. Zarudin, commander of NGF, summarized discussion results. He emphasized that under present-day conditions, when the U.S. imperialists and their NATO allies are attempting to impose a new round of the arms race on the world and attempting to achieve military superiority over Warsaw Pact countries, a special significance is acquired by Lenin's behests to be on guard, to safeguard the defenses of the country and Army as the apple of one's eye, and to learn military affairs in a genuine manner.

Conference became familiar with the book exhibit "V. I. Lenin on Defense of the Socialist Homeland" and "Combat Cooperation of the Fraternal Armies" and they viewed documentary films on Vladimir Il'ich Lenin.

Friendship of NGF soldiers with soldiers of the Polish Army and with the PNR populace also grows strong in a joint struggle against natural disasters. Our soldiers protected railroad bridges on the Oder and on the Wroclaw-Opole-Katowice line against ice jams. Soviet and Polish servicemen more than once have fought floods and snowdrifts together. Residents of Poznan are thankful to combat engineers of the NGF for the extensive work of clearing the ruins of the Poznan citadel, on the site of which a Friendship Park has been laid out today.

Active use is made of lecture propaganda and political training of the personnel in the work of international indoctrination of personnel and further

strengthening of friendship with workers and combat cooperation with soldiers of the PNR. Each year political studies cover the topics "Successes of PNR workers in building a developed socialist society," "The Polish People's Army is our combat friend" and "Bear on high the honor and dignity of the Soviet soldier beyond the borders of the native country."

The NGF Museum of Combat Glory and Combat Cooperation serves to strengthen friendship with workers and soldiers of the PNR. It is visited by Polish soldiers, workers, schoolchildren and students.

The NGF Song and Dance Ensemble, a staff band and amateur art groups make their contribution toward strengthening Soviet-Polish combat cooperation. For example, last year the Ensemble gave over 60 concerts attended by some 100,000 Polish spectators. Performances by the Group Officers' Club "Lira" vocal-instrumental ensemble are popular.

Of course, far from all reserves and opportunities are yet being used in the work in question. A further improvement in organizing international indoctrination of soldiers can be achieved by making use of the complex of all elements of political studies and mass agitation work. This is just what is required of us by decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work."

The goal-oriented work of commanders, political entities, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations in the international indoctrination of soldiers, workers, employees and family members contributes to their development of qualities as patriots-internationalists who bear on high the honor and dignity of the Soviet citizen abroad.

The friendship of Soviet soldiers with soldiers of the Polish People's Army, sealed by the blood shed on the battlefields, grows stronger and develops more each year. Defenders of socialist achievements head for new achievements in military labor in a common combat formation, steadfastly achieving heightened vigilance and combat readiness and sparing no energy for selfless performance of international duty.

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POLITICAL TRAINING: ROLE OF MARXISM-LENINISM UNIVERSITIES

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[Article by Capt 2d Rank V. Sivogorakov, senior instructor of a department of agitprop directorate of Main Political Directorate of Soviet Army and Navy, under the heading "High Quality and Effectiveness in Ideological Work": "The Political Department and the Marxism-Leninism University"]

[Text] The CPSU assigns major complex missions in ideological and political indoctrination work: to arm the Soviet people and each new generation with the invincible weapon of historical truth and a detailed understanding of the laws and prospects of social development, with reliance on the immutable foundation of Marxist-Leninist teaching. A large part in accomplishing these missions is played by the system of party studies and economic education, by Komsomol political enlightenment and by mass forms of propaganda.

Marxism-Leninism universities play one of the leading roles in the USSR Armed Forces in the struggle to implement party demands set forth in the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." They are called upon to raise the ideological-theoretical level of officers and of the broad circle of the aktiv from among warrant officers, NCO's and petty officers on extended service, and Army and Navy workers and employees, and to carry out the training and retraining of propagandists for all levels of the personnel's political studies.

Students of Marxism-Leninism universities study Lenin's ideological-theoretical heritage, problems of Marxist-Leninist theory, such current issues as the growing role of the CPSU in building communism and defending the achievements of socialism, ways of increasing the effectiveness and quality of ideological work, shaping Soviet citizens' communist ideology, developing their active position in life, and the features and methods of ideological struggle in the international arena at the contemporary stage.

There has been a noticeable increase in interest in studying key issues of economic and social-political development of Soviet society, party organizational development, party-political work, party propaganda and foreign policy activities of the CPSU and Soviet state.

The past training year in the system of party education indicated that Marxism-Leninism universities stepped up their work and raised the effectiveness and quality of the entire training and indoctrination process. They possess everything necessary for ideological conditioning of students: qualified instructors and a good facility. There has been a noticeable increase in attention paid to their work on the part of political entities and party organizations. The latter do not limit themselves to posing general tasks, but delve deeply into the essence of the training process. Workers of political entities constantly attend classes, help arrange students' propaganda practice and participate in conducting seminars, tests and quizzes and in defending course and diploma projects. Military council members and commanders and political workers of combined units and units regularly speak to the students. This enriches the content of studies, reinforces their link with troop life and activities, and has a positive effect on the students' indoctrination. A majority of them set the example of exemplary performance of their official duties.

Considerable work was done in the past training year to select and place instructors of Marxism-Leninism universities and to raise their professional expertise. And the result was not slow in telling. Highly qualified instructors with both methods proficiency and a good knowledge of military life and missions being accomplished by students in the units and aboard ships are working in a majority of Marxism-Leninism universities.

For example, instructors colonels G. Kudryashov and A. Mitrinyuk gave an excellent account of themselves in the Marxism-Leninism university where Engr-Maj S. Strel'tsov is the chief. They possess extensive theoretical knowledge, great methods proficiency and the skills of propaganda and indoctrination work. Their lectures and seminars naturally appeal to students, contribute to their ideological conditioning and expand their horizons. Other instructors also enjoy authority among the students. All of them make their contributions to improving the training process and to the struggle for a high level of lectures, seminars and practical classes.

No small credit goes to the political entity for the fact that a group of experienced instructors has formed in the Marxism-Leninism university. At the beginning of the training year its chief chats with each comrade, reminds of him of the high responsibility imposed on him and advises how best to take account of features of the upcoming training year and what must be done to draw the students into active work involving mastery of program material. Such thorough discussions not only make the instructors' tasks concrete, but they also orient instructors for serious, systematized work, for increasing their knowledge of military pedagogics and psychology, for improving the methodology of party propaganda and agitation, and for mastering foremost experience in training and indoctrination.

But this is only the beginning, as they say. Later, throughout the training year, instructors feel the constant concern on the part of the political department for their professional, ideological-theoretical and methods growth. Instructional methods courses are held regularly with them at least

every three months. There is a discussion of the most important theoretical problems and an exchange of experience in conducting lectures, seminars and interviews, and in the struggle for raising the ideological content of classes, organizing the students' social-political practice and improving the use of technical training facilities. Much attention is given to prompt briefing of instructors on the most burning issues of international life and the military-political situation. They are always knowledgeable of the primary operational training missions which garrison units have to accomplish.

Political department workers help instructors organize the students' independent training better and they take the necessary steps to improve the university's training facility and to create necessary conditions for the students' productive work. For example, training methods rooms recently set up on all subjects being studied were of great benefit. Methods recommendations and were developed for the leading training disciplines, for preparing papers and course projects and for accomplishing practical assignments. There is a small library which includes complete lecture courses on Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, scientific communism and current problems of party theory and politics in light of decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress which have been discussed at sessions of the scientific methods council.

University students find everything necessary for high-quality independent training in the information reference center. A reading room, book depositary and card file on all sections of the training program are at their service. Arrangements have been made for qualified instructor-consultants to be on duty at a specific time. Selections of primary sources and other necessary literature are prepared ahead of time for each seminar session. They are used not only by today's students, but also by correspondence-course students of higher educational institutions and many activists of mass agitation work. They always receive necessary advice and qualified assistance in the resolution of many-sided issues of political indoctrination work.

Also of importance is the fact that the decoration of training rooms and auditoriums, detailed in content and performed on a high artistic level, has been done by university students themselves. Political department officers also take an active part in this. Many students display imagination and initiative in preparing sketches, selecting necessary reference material and participating in the layout of displays and boards. They also used the skills obtained in the process of this work when renewing material of visual agitation in their subunits.

It can be said that the Marxism-Leninism university is a subject of constant concern for all political department workers without exception. It was thanks to their assistance and daily attention that the university became a genuine center of ideological-theoretical training of propaganda cadres for units and subunits.

Many other political entities also display constant concern for increasing the ideological-theoretical and training methods level of classes, for organizing the students' independent work, for improving the technical facility of the universities and for reinforcing them with experienced instructors. This concern is being repaid a hundredfold. Having received detailed theoretical knowledge, students of Marxism-Leninism universities usually perform their assigned work successfully, perform extensive ideological indoctrination work among the troops and become reliable assistants of the commanders and their political deputies in accomplishing all tasks. Here is an example.

Regimental commander Col I. Inayenko and [artillery] battalion deputy commander for political affairs Sr Lt V. Chebonyuk are named among the leading officers of one of the military districts. They give all their energy to the assigned job and participate actively in propaganda and ideological indoctrination work. Both officers are former students of a Marxism-Leninism university. Training there contributed to an increase in their ideological conditioning, the shaping of high moral qualities and development of responsibility for the assigned sector of work. And many such facts can be cited.

The Marxism-Leninism university headed by Lt Col I. Rodionov is attended by officers of the Riga Higher Military Aviation Engineering School (men) Yakov Alkanis. At the present time many chiefs of chairs and departments and senior instructors are increasing their ideological-theoretical knowledge and honing their propaganda proficiency in various faculties of the university. And all of them serve as an example in performance of official duties and indoctrination of cadets. For example, senior instructor Engr-Col B. Belkin, graduate of a Marxism-Leninism university, enjoys great authority among instructors and cadets at the school. In the last training year he was advanced to the position of chief of a chair. It is noteworthy that 90 percent of officers of this chair's collective have completed or are studying in the Marxism-Leninism university. For two years in a row the chair has held the title of outstanding. Marxism-Leninism university students Engr-Col S. Glukhov, Engr-Col I. Limarenko and others were declared the best instructors. Subunits headed by Engr-Capt V. Gladilin and Engr-Capt A. Matyushenko achieved the title of outstanding.

The political department, faculty party committees and chair party bureaus constantly monitor the studies of university students and provide conditions for increasing the quality of their training. Each student has an opportunity to receive the necessary methods assistance at all times from officers of the political department and experienced instructors of social sciences. Party organizations hear reports from party members who are students at the university on fulfillment of the training program and practical assignments and on independent work on recommended literature.

Party organizations plan and carry out specific practical measures for improving attendance and progress in classes. At one time Engr-Maj Yu. Bukharov, Engr-Capt V. Denidov and Engr-Capt Yu. Zharov were subjected to just and exacting criticism for poor progress and missing classes. They drew proper conclusions from the comradely criticism and eliminated their training debt.

A majority of political entities of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Red Banner Odessa Military District, Red Banner Black Sea Fleet and other districts, groups of forces and fleets show concern for raising the level of classes in Marxism-Leninism universities. For example, certain political entities of the Black Sea Fleet have gained instructive experience. A majority of students in Fleet Marxism-Leninism universities are serving aboard ships and often are on deployments which many times are lengthy ones, and they do not manage to attend lectures or seminars. At times this has led to a situation where students have been in arrears and were behind in studying the program. This situation naturally alarmed the heads of the universities and political entity workers. They began to seek a solution together, and it was found. Now, before putting to sea, each student receives an independent work assignment. It indicates the mandatory minimum of literature for study, topics of papers, course projects and diploma projects, and topics of presentations to the ship's personnel. The political departments obligated each political worker to exercise strict supervision over the fulfillment of such assignments and to give students necessary assistance. All this had a positive effect on students' progress and sharply reduced the number of laggards in training among them.

When we speak about the political entity's attention to the Marxism-Leninism university and about constant concern for a high level of the training process therein, we have in mind above all a persistent, goal-oriented and resolute struggle against everything which even to a slight extent has a negative effect on the students' training, and concrete assistance on the spot in solving problems involving fulfillment of demands of the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." Taking note of shortcomings in organization of the training and indoctrination work, the Central Committee points out that it still does not always meet the heightened educational and cultural level and needs of Soviet citizens and gives insufficient consideration to the dynamic nature of social-economic processes and the spiritual life of contemporary Soviet society and the nature of the sharply aggravated ideological struggle in the international arena. It is from this position that we must proceed in evaluating the work of Marxism-Leninism universities, achieve complete elimination of the shortcomings noted, ensure a high scientific, methods and organizational level of lectures, interviews and seminars, develop the offensive character of propaganda, and reinforce its efficiency, concreteness and link with life. Experience indicates that we cannot get by in solving these problems without the political entity performing a detailed and comprehensive analysis of various aspects of the work of the Marxism-Leninism university, its director and each instructor and without taking effective steps to eliminate all kinds of omissions. There are no secondary matters meriting no attention in this matter. Everything is identically important: selection and indoctrination of instructors, their briefings, a review of lectures, attendance of political entity representatives at lectures and seminars with a subsequent critique, meetings with students where there is a frank exchange of opinion and the expression of suggestions and desires, concern for visual aids and textbooks, concern for the premises, which should be well lighted and comfortable, and concern for transportation.

If just one of these and many other problems is not solved, the result immediately will affect the level of the training process. For example, in the Marxism-Leninism university where Lt Col N. Averkov is chief the students in seminar sessions often come together in large groups. Under such conditions it is impossible to achieve high effectiveness of a seminar. A considerable number of class absences in that same university are caused by insufficiently precise operation of transportation assigned for carrying students living a considerable distance from the university. The political department knows about this but for some reason is not taking appreciable steps.

In analyzing the reasons for poor attendance at classes in some universities, one concludes that the reasons again lie in the low level of exactingness of political entities. For there are still instances where students are sent for studies without a comprehensive discussion of their candidacy. This leads to a situation where comrades with neither the appropriate training nor the desire to increase their ideological-theoretical knowledge sometimes come to the Marxism-Leninism university. On encountering difficulties, they immediately abandon studies. This can be avoided if people who genuinely strive for knowledge and who are capable of overcoming all difficulties on the path to the goal are chosen as students. Possible changes in their service also can be foreseen in a detailed discussion of candidacies and a person to be transferred to another post not be given a recommendation.

In the university mentioned above over 50 persons were released from the first course of various faculties during the training year. A majority of them interrupted studies because of a service transfer. But a few persons were in the university by chance and were dismissed for poor progress and infractions of military discipline. These are alarming facts. They might not have been had the university heads and political entity displayed greater responsibility in the selection of student candidates, ensured a high level of classes, and were more exacting toward those who began to perform their duties in a slipshod manner after beginning studies.

Each year Marxism-Leninism universities are assigned increasingly complex tasks involving a further increase in the level of training and ideological-theoretical preparation of students. More and more attention is being given to their indoctrination in the example of Lenin's life and works and propaganda of his ideological-theoretical heritage and the heroic revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. Much is being done for a detailed and well-reasoned exposure of the aggressive intrigues of imperialism and its Chinese minions, of bourgeois and reformist ideology, and of Maoism and Zionism. Much concern is being shown for improving the students' moral indoctrination, increasing their service and labor activity, and stepping up the struggle for outstanding indicators in fulfilling socialist pledges and combat and political training plans. Success in accomplishing these tasks depends to a decisive extent on the level of management of Marxism-Leninism universities on the part of political entities and on the concern they show and will show for high effectiveness of lectures and seminars, for the instructors' methods

proficiency, for increasing their sense of responsibility, and developing initiative and imagination; on the day-to-day strict control which prevents all kinds of shortcomings from arising and developing in the training process; and on constant assistance in the struggle for its high ideological spirit and organization.

In preparing for the new training year thoroughly and comprehensively, the heads and instructors of Marxism-Leninism universities proceed from demands of the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," which obligates constant concern for elevating ideological work to a qualitatively higher level, meeting the demands of developed socialism and the new tasks of building communism. The decree takes note of the close interconnection of successes in ideological and political indoctrination work with the achievements in all areas of national economic, social-political and cultural development. This interconnection also is characteristic of the life and work of military collectives. This is why, in displaying special concern for further increasing troop combat readiness, we must constantly maintain a focus on problems of improving ideological work. The heads, scientific methods councils and instructors of Marxism-Leninism universities view their tasks from this position. They are full of resolve to go further and achieve more while relying on the accumulated experience in organizing a highly effective training process and making vigorous use of it.

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POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF SOCIALISM

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[Article by Col N. Voronov, under the heading "For Political Study Group Instructors": "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the International Character of Defending the Achievements of Socialism"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Eight hours are allocated for studying this topic. Of these, it is advisable to set aside two hours for lecture, two for independent study of literature by the students and four hours for a seminar.

/In the lecture/ it is recommended that the following questions be covered: 1. V. I. Lenin on the importance of international solidarity in defending the achievements of socialism. 2. The CPSU's embodiment of Leninist ideas on internationalism in the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period. 3. Friendship of nations of fraternal countries and the combat alliance of their armies is a reliable guarantee for defense of the achievements of socialism.

The presentation of these questions can be prefaced by introductory remarks stressing that the Soviet people and all progressive mankind recently celebrated the 110th Anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin--the great leader and teacher of workers around the world, the genius and theorist of Marxism, fiery revolutionary, organizer of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and founder of the Soviet socialist state--extensively and solemnly. Under the leadership of V. I. Lenin and the party he created, our country's workers made the Great October Socialist Revolution 62 years ago. The victory of October, the main event of the 20th century, fundamentally changed the course of development of all mankind. As a result of this victory the first socialist state in the world arose on one-sixth of the globe. The difficult but honorable role of trailblazer in creating a new society fell to the proletariat of multinational Russia.

V. I. Lenin wrote that "...we have the right to be proud and we are proud that the good fortune fell to our lot to /begin/ building a Soviet state, /to begin/ a new era in world history with this, an era of a state of a

/new/ class oppressed in all capitalist countries and everywhere heading for a new life, for a victory over the bourgeoisie, for a dictatorship of the proletariat and for ridding mankind of the yoke of capital and of imperialist wars" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XLIV, 148).

The Great October Socialist Revolution marked the beginning of a new era not only in the history of Russia; it opened up a new era in world history--one of a revolutionary renewal of the world, an era of a transition of mankind from capitalism to socialism and communism. The path began along which today hundreds of millions of people proceed and along which all mankind is destined to proceed.

It should be emphasized that one of the important factors which assured success of the Great October was the proletarian solidarity of workers and support of the revolution by the international proletariat. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev remarked that "one of the remarkable traits of the October Revolution was the proletarian internationalism which tied Russia's workers in firm bonds with their brothers in class throughout the world. It can be said with full substantiation that the victory of October also is a victory of the international brotherhood of workers, a victory of proletarian internationalism" ("Leninskim kursom" [With a Leninist Course], II, 81).

It is important to explain that proletarian internationalism is one of the chief principles of the ideology and politics of the working class and of Marxist-Leninist parties. It is reflected in the international solidarity of the working class, its communist vanguard and toilers of all countries and nations; in the unity and coordination of their actions; in assistance to each other; in mutual support in the struggle against international capital and for democracy and socialism.

The idea of proletarian internationalism was proclaimed and substantiated for the first time by K. Marx and F. Engels. It was reflected in the famous appeal "Workers of the world, unite!", which became a battle cry of the international workers' and communist movement. Describing proletarian internationalism, Lenin called it the ideology and politics of the working class and its ideology in the question of nationalities, which is directly opposite to the ideology of bourgeois nationalism.

Prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution proletarian internationalism signified the international solidarity of workers and toilers in their fight for overthrowing capitalism and winning state power. After the victory of the Great October it also was reflected in support given the first socialist state in the world by the international proletariat and in the support by the Soviet Union of the world workers' and national liberation movement. After the victory of socialist revolutions in a number of countries and formation of a world system of socialism, a strengthening of the unity and solidarity of countries of socialism and establishment of truly fraternal relations among them also became one of the most important manifestations of proletarian internationalism. A socialist internationalism arose, which represented a new and higher level in the development of proletarian internationalism.

Socialist internationalism rests on a commonality of fundamental interests of the working class and all peoples of socialist states. The socialist countries have the same type of economic system, based on public ownership of means of production, the same type of state system--power of the people headed by the working class, a common ideology--Marxism-Leninism, common interests in defending revolutionary achievements and national independence, and a common supreme goal--the building of communism. Because of this socialist internationalism became the state policy of fraternal countries. The principle of socialist internationalism is fixed in the USSR Constitution. Its 30th Article states: "The USSR as a component of the world system of socialism and the socialist community develops and reinforces friendship, cooperation and comradely mutual assistance with countries of socialism on the basis of the principle of socialist internationalism; and it participates actively in economic integration and the international socialist division of labor." One of the primary tasks of political cooperation of fraternal countries and a supreme manifestation of international duty is the joint defense of achievements of socialism against encroachments by world imperialism and the reaction.

The propagandist then proceeds to presenting the first question.

1. V. I. Lenin on the Importance of International Solidarity in Defending the Achievements of Socialism

V. I. Lenin developed an orderly system of views on the international character of defense of the achievements of socialism. He revealed the inseparable unity of its national and international tasks. This unity is defined by the commonality of class interests of different national detachments of the proletariat and by the merging of their goals in the struggle against capitalism. The international character of the proletariat's struggle is embodied in the unification of efforts of workers of all countries and their fraternal solidarity and mutual assistance in winning victory over the world bourgeoisie and the final establishment of socialism both in individual countries and throughout the planet.

The world bourgeoisie and imperialism is the common class enemy in the fight for revolutionary reorganization of the world and elimination of the system of hired slavery and of the exploitation of man by man among workers, no matter what their nationality. Lenin pointed out that "capital is an international force. To defeat it, there must be an international alliance of workers, an international brotherhood of them" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XL, 43).

Lenin foresaw that the imperialist bourgeoisie would attempt to unify its forces so as together to eliminate the achievements of the socialist revolution where it had occurred. He pointed out that the imperialists would not limit themselves merely to the use of economic, political and ideological means for weakening the new social system, but would attempt to use the force of arms. Therefore the socialist revolution had to be able to counter a class enemy armed to the teeth with indestructible military might.

Lenin deemed defense of the achievements of socialism to be the supreme international duty not only of workers of the country in which the proletarian revolution had been victorious and in which a new social system existed, but also of the entire international proletariat. The fate of the revolution in one's own country and development of the world revolutionary process in all countries were identically dear to the true internationalist.

The great leader repeatedly pointed out that as the international front of the liberation struggle expanded and new nations moved onto the path of socialism, the resistance of the bourgeoisie would be transformed from a national resistance to an international resistance. Consequently the defense of socialism against aggression of world capital inevitably had to acquire an international character. He taught that peoples who had taken the socialist path of development "need without fail a close military and economic alliance, since otherwise the capitalists . . . will crush and stifle us individually" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XI, 56). He resolutely spoke out against those who attempted to disrupt this alliance in the years of the Civil War. Lenin said, having in mind an association of forces of the young Soviet republics, that "...standing against the enormous front of imperialist powers, we who are struggling against imperialism represent an alliance demanding close military solidarity, and we view any attempt to disrupt this solidarity as a completely inadmissible phenomenon, as betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism. . . . We say: There must be a unity of military forces and deviation from this unity is inadmissible" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XI, 98-99).

Vladimir Il'ich angrily branded those pseudorevolutionaries who merely talked profusely about internationalism. He demanded a genuine, daily, effective struggle for implementing the political slogans of internationalism, emphasizing that "internationalism consists not of phrases or an expression of solidarity and not of resolutions, but of /fact/" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXIV, 280). Any person who shirks fulfilling international duties places the entire future of the international socialist revolution at stake.

The downfall of the old world and birth of the first socialist state were accompanied, as Lenin foresaw, by a fierce class struggle which developed into civil war. Joint forces of the internal counterrevolution and world imperialism fell upon the young Soviet republic in an attempt to trample the socialist revolution in blood and stifle the young republic. The largest capitalist countries of Europe as well as the United States and Japan took part in the intervention. The working class countered the joint forces of counterrevolution with the great force of proletarian solidarity born of the revolution. The sons of all peoples of our homeland fought the enemy shoulder to shoulder at fronts of the Civil War under Red Army colors. They went into battle together for the power of the Soviets. As in the unforgettable days of the Great October, the international solidarity of the working class and of all toiling peoples was one of the important sources of our victory in the Civil War and the years of foreign military intervention.

It should be noted that in the first stage the activation of a new, socialist type of army was accomplished within the framework of the individual Soviet republics. But the need to defend the achievements of the revolution demanded a unification of military forces and centralized leadership of them. Lenin's idea of creating a military-political alliance of Soviet republics for waging a revolutionary war met full support of the workers. A session of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] was held in Moscow on 1 June 1919 jointly with representatives of a number of Soviet republics. It adopted a decree on unification of military forces of Russia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Belorussia. This document recognized the insistent need for military unity of the nations and conclusion of appropriate agreements with other republics. A reorganization of military departments of the Soviet republics and their armed formations was carried out, uniformity in military policy was established and the task of merging armies and unifying the country's human and material resources was resolved on the basis of the VTsIK decree. The military-political alliance formed in the Civil War years played a deciding role in defeating the forces of the internal and external counterrevolution.

From the very first days of its existence, the army of the Land of Soviets became an army of friendship and brotherhood of peoples, an army of internationalists. By the end of the Civil War the Red Army included representatives of almost 50 nationalities. Displaying unparalleled courage and heroism, Soviet soldiers crushed the united forces of the counterrevolution and hurled the interventionists beyond the borders of our country.

The political, economic and military alliance of all nations and nationalities of our country--the real embodiment of Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism--rallied and grew stronger in the flame of civil war.

The Great October was a school of internationalism not only for the peoples of Russia, but also for millions of proletarians and workers of foreign countries. It generated an upsurge of the movement of international solidarity of the international proletariat unprecedented in the past. "Hands off Soviet Russia!"--workers of many countries acted under this motto in defense of the young socialist republic against imperialist predators. At that time some 300,000 soldier-internationalists--Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, Germans, Chinese and representatives of many other nations--flowed into the Red Army to fight a common enemy. At various times dozens of different international formations--divisions, brigades, rifle and cavalry regiments, battalions, squadrons and detachments--operated at fronts of the Civil War. Defending achievements of the Great October together with the Soviet people, soldier-internationalists were imbued with a spirit of proletarian solidarity and class brotherhood. It was in those heroic times that a firm foundation was laid for the future combat cooperation of armies of a new type that history had not before known. This class, proletarian fighting alliance was secured by blood shed jointly on the battlefield for the bright ideals of communism.

V. I. Lenin highly esteemed the movement of internationalists. He saw in it the great brotherhood of oppressed nations which had risen to fight against the exploiters. Addressing fighting men heading for the front who were part of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment, which consisted of Polish volunteers, Vladimir Il'ich said in August 1918: "The great honor has fallen to you to defend with guns in hand the sacred ideas and . . . implement in fact the international brotherhood of nations" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXVII, 26).

Accepting the fraternal assistance of workers of other countries with gratitude, Soviet citizens always have performed their international duty with honor. The Soviet Union has given and is giving effective economic, political and other assistance to revolutionary forces in their just struggle for social and national liberation. Soviet citizens did everything possible to support the revolutionary struggle of the working class of Germany, Austria and Hungary in 1918-1919. In 1921 the Red Army assisted the Mongolian people to defeat the White Guard bands of Ungern and troops of foreign invaders. In 1939 the Red Army together with units of the Mongolian People's Army crushed the Japanese militarists who had invaded the territory of the MNR [Mongolian People's Republic] at the Khalkhin-Gol River.

The Soviet state gave the Chinese people an exceptionally large amount of political and moral support and military-economic assistance throughout its entire struggle for national independence and freedom. For example, in 1923-1927 the Soviet Union helped China organize the Peoples' Revolutionary Army by sending volunteers and military advisers there headed by the prominent Soviet military leader V. K. Blyukher. In 1937-1939 the Soviet Union again provided fraternal assistance to the Chinese people in the fight against Japanese imperialism.

The Soviet Union's assistance to the Spanish Republic in 1936-1939, when Hitler Germany and fascist Italy organized an intervention against it for the purpose of supporting fascist mutineers, was a bright page in the history of international proletarian solidarity. Soviet volunteers in Spain fought in international brigades of the republican army and covered themselves with unfading glory.

In 1939 Soviet soldiers performed their international duty in a campaign of liberation into the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, and in 1940 they came to the assistance of workers of the Baltic republics: By their presence they prevented the suppression of proletarian revolutions in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

A conclusion can be drawn at the end of the first question that proletarian internationalism is a grand tradition of the working class and its vanguard, the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties. It was tempered in the flame of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War and received further development in subsequent years. The life-giving force of proletarian internationalism was displayed especially vividly in the Great Patriotic War years.

2. The CPSU's Embodiment of Leninist Ideas on Internationalism in the Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period

It should be recalled that the 35th Anniversary of the Great Victory over German fascism--the chief shock force of world imperialism--recently was widely celebrated in our country and abroad. In a mortal clash with fascism our people performed an exploit, the equal of which history had never before known. The Soviet people and their valorous Armed Forces, under the leadership of the Communist Party, dealt a crushing defeat to Hitler Germany and its satellites, defended the freedom and independence of the socialist homeland, carried out a great mission of liberation and honorably fulfilled their international duty.

In the past war our Army, brought up by the party of Lenin, appeared to the entire world as a true friend and defender of the workers and as an Army-liberator, the bulwark of humanism and justice. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev writes in his book "Malaya Zemlya": "For decades the imperialists slandered our party. For decades the monstrous fables about our life and our people were drummed into the heads of the people. Then the Soviet citizen came to Europe as a liberator. It was important not to discredit this high humane mission in any way, and our soldiers did not. People everywhere saw in them selfless, humane, just, war-scorched people full of nobility."

The great liberation mission of the Soviet Army during the Patriotic War was a natural and proper continuation of the Leninist international policy which the CPSU and Soviet government have conducted invariably and consistently since the day of victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. It stems from the essence of the Soviet social and state system and Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The USSR began to accomplish a liberation mission with respect to the peoples of Europe and Asia enslaved by German fascism and Japanese militarism actually from the first days it entered World War II. The course and outcome of this war was decided at the Soviet-German front. It was here that the backbone of the fascist beast was broken. By the summer of 1944 the Soviet Army had crushed 370 enemy divisions and the overall enemy losses surpassed 5.5 million. A total of 607 enemy divisions, three-fourths of his aircraft and the greater part of his tanks were defeated at the Soviet-German front before the war ended. Ten million of the 13.6 million dead, wounded and captured Hitlerites during the war years were lost at the Soviet-German front. The defeat of the main forces of Germany and its satellites was the deciding factor in the Soviet Army's accomplishment of the liberation mission.

Our Army began the direct liberation of peoples of Europe of the fascist yoke with its move to the Soviet-Romanian border in late March 1944 and to the Soviet-Polish border in July of that same year, and with its move onto the territory of these countries. For over a year more than seven million Soviet soldiers fought stubborn battles with the Hitlerite hordes on the

territory of European states for their liberation. There were 1.5 million of our soldiers who took part in military operations in the Far East. During World War II the Soviet Armed Forces freed a total of 13 states of Europe and Asia with a population of some 200 million persons totally or partially of the fascist German and Japanese invaders.

More than 20 million Soviet citizens gave their lives in a mortal clash with fascism for the freedom and independence of our Motherland and for liberation of nations of the enslaved countries. There were 600,000 Soviet soldiers who died in fighting on Polish soil alone. The graves of more than 140,000 of our officers and men are located on the territory of Czechoslovakia. Just as many perished on the territory of Hungary. Many thousands of Soviet soldiers laid their heads to rest in liberating Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria, the northern parts of Norway, northeast China (Manchuria) and Korea. The total losses of the Soviet Army in fighting for the liberation of nations of foreign countries from fascist German and Japanese occupiers consisted of more than three million persons dead, wounded or missing.

Peoples of the world highly esteemed the great international exploit of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces. This is attested by numerous memorials, monuments and obelisks erected in many countries in honor of the Soviet soldier-liberators and by the names of streets and squares in cities.

It should be emphasized that troops of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Albania and, after people's uprisings, troops of Bulgaria and Romania fought bravely shoulder to shoulder with Soviet soldiers against fascist invaders during the war years. At the end of the war the Hungarian Buda Volunteer Regiment participated in fighting against the Hitlerites. German antifascists and patriots headed by the German Communist Party fought the Hitlerite regime and for its defeat. Troops of the Mongolian People's Republic fought together with the Soviet Army in combat operations against imperialist Japan.

Many national military formations were activated on USSR territory with its immediate participation and active assistance. The Soviet Union gave much assistance in providing foreign formations with arms and military equipment. A total of 19 infantry, 5 artillery and 5 air divisions, 6 infantry and airborne brigades, 8 tank and motorized rifle brigades, 12 artillery and mortar brigades, 5 combat engineer brigades and many other foreign units and subunits were armed and trained through the efforts of our state during the Great Patriotic War. The total number of these formations against Hitler Germany by war's end reached 555,000 persons. Prior to May 1945 the Soviet state provided them with some 960,000 rifles, carbines and submachineguns, 16,502 guns and mortars, 40,627 machineguns, 1,124 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mounts], 2,346 aircraft and much more military equipment. Soviet officer-instructors played a considerable role in combat training of Polish, Czechoslovakian, Romanian and Yugoslav units activated during the war on our national territory. The foundations of contemporary socialist armies thus were laid down with the Soviet Union's help during the Great Patriotic War and the international combat cooperation of future armed forces of countries of socialism was tempered in a joint struggle against fascism.

The brotherhood in arms born in the first years of Soviet power and widely developed during the past war is an example of the embodiment of Leninist ideas of proletarian internationalism in the practice of military affairs and the combat cooperation of nations in a fight against the forces of international imperialist reaction.

The CPSU and the communist and workers' parties of fraternal countries of socialism invariably were guided in the postwar period and are being guided by Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism and the international solidarity of workers in defense of revolutionary achievements and in the struggle against imperialist aggression and for the freedom and independence of nations. The international solidarity of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community has had a sobering effect on the imperialist aggressors more than once and has forced them to give up their predatory schemes.

That was the case, for example, in 1950-1953, when the socialist countries gave all possible support to the Korean People's Democratic Republic in its patriotic war of liberation against foreign invaders. In 1956 the Soviet Union gave fraternal assistance to the Hungarian people in putting down a counterrevolutionary mutiny unleashed by internal reaction with the active assistance of imperialist powers. In 1961 an imperialist provocation against the GDR on the part of U.S. and FRG militarists was prevented and in the following year the Soviet Union and other countries of socialism resolutely acted in defense of revolutionary Cuba. As a result, the aggressive plans of American imperialists to put down the socialist revolution in Cuba failed.

The Soviet Union and the entire friendly family of socialist countries did not leave the Vietnamese people in the lurch when they were subjected to aggression by American imperialism. The major attempt by imperialism since World War II to settle with a socialist state by force of arms and crush the national liberation revolution failed. The heroism and selflessness of the Vietnamese people, connected with resolute support to them by countries of socialism and the progressive public of the entire world, proved stronger than armies of interventionists and their accomplices armed to the teeth. Soviet citizens also gave great assistance to Vietnam in repulsing Chinese aggression in 1979.

True to principles of socialist internationalism, the Soviet people could not remain indifferent when a threat hovered over the socialist system in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 on the part of counterrevolutionary, anti-communist forces which had entered a deal with the imperialists. Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR and Poland came to the help of workers of Czechoslovakia together with the Soviet Union. The joint efforts of fraternal countries prevented a counterrevolutionary overthrow in the CSSR. Plans of international imperialism to rip Czechoslovakia from the socialist community suffered failure.

great assistance by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was given to the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea in the national liberation struggle and to African peoples fighting for freedom and independence. The Soviet Union came to the help of democratic Afghanistan in its fight against external aggression on the part of imperialist forces and their accomplices.

In providing comprehensive assistance to the nations of other countries in their struggle for their national and social liberation and for the preservation and strengthening of socialist achievements, the CPSU teaches the Soviet people to take guidance from Lenin's behest "to use all forces and means at their disposal to support the fraternal revolutionary movement of the proletariat of all countries" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXVI, 36). The leader of the international proletariat saw the essence of proletarian internationalism in a unification of workers around the world regardless of nationality or race "into one fraternal alliance for a fight against any oppression, against any tyranny, against any exploitation, for a socialist organization of society" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," X, 81).

The inference can be drawn as a conclusion to the second question that under present-day conditions peoples conducting a just struggle of liberation or defending their revolutionary achievements have an opportunity not only to stand up against the aggression of the largest imperialist powers, but also to defeat them if they are guided by Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism and the international solidarity of workers and if in their struggle they rely on the firm support of the Soviet Union and other countries of socialism. The unity and solidarity of socialist countries is the chief source of their strength and invincibility and a most important factor for curbing imperialist aggressors.

3. Friendship of Peoples of Fraternal Countries and the Combat Alliance of Their Armies is a Reliable Guarantee of Defense of the Achievements of Socialism

In beginning presentation of this question, it should be emphasized that Leninist ideas of the international character of defense of the achievements of socialism acquired special importance with the formation of the world socialist system.

The victory of socialist revolutions in a number of European and Asiatic countries after World War II and the transformation of socialism into a world system were the natural result of the development of the world revolutionary process and a continuation of the work of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which marked the beginning of a new historic era--an era of all mankind's transition from capitalism to communism. The formation and successful development of the world socialist system led to a radical change in the correlation of forces in the world in favor of socialism. Now imperialism never again will be able to return its lost historic initiative or turn back the development of the modern world.

The CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin" states: "Solidified on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, the world socialist community is in the vanguard of social progress, is the most dynamic economic and political force, the bulwark of peace and security of nations. . . . The prosperity of each of the countries in the socialist community is connected inseparably with a strengthening of their ideological-political unity, with the growing commonality in politics, economics and social life and with the development of productive, full-fledged cooperation in all areas. An example of such cooperation is the interworking of fraternal countries within the framework of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance, based on Leninist principles of international solidarity."

The political and economic cooperation of fraternal countries augments the strength and might of each of them and at the same time contributes to a reinforcement of the socialist community as a whole. Together with the prosperity of each socialist nation and a reinforcement of the sovereignty of socialist states, their mutual ties become ever closer, more and more elements of commonality appear in their politics, economics and social life, and there is a gradual evening off of levels of development. This process of gradual rapprochement of countries of socialism now is manifested very definitively as a natural pattern.

Building a new society hand in hand, the fraternal countries of socialism achieved outstanding success. This success was linked inseparably with the work of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). It was 30 years old last year. Comrade Brezhnev remarked in the greeting to participants of the 33d CEMA Session that economic cooperation and socialist economic integration have become an inalienable feature of the life of the socialist community and a powerful and stable factor of comprehensive progress of the fraternal countries. Today ten socialist states of Europe, Asia and America cooperate in CEMA: Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, with 437 million persons living in them. Yugoslavia has taken part in the work of a number of CEMA agencies since 1964.

During the three decades of CEMA's work the states belonging thereto have multiplied their economic potential many times over. For example, from 1948 through 1978 the national income of CEMA countries rose almost tenfold, while industrial production increased 15 times. At the present time the volume of industrial production in CEMA countries is approximately twice that of Common Market states. Occupying 19 percent of the territory and with 10 percent of the earth's population, CEMA countries have become the largest economic complex with approximately one-third of the world industrial output, one-fourth of national income and one-fifth of agricultural products of all countries in the world.

CEMA states consistently implement the Complex Program of Socialist Economic Integration. The coordination of national economic plans conducted under this program, the international specialization and cooperative production,

and long-range special programs for cooperation expand the capabilities of rational use of raw materials, energy resources and labor resources of the states in the community and permit fuller use of the advantages of the socialist system of economy.

One can recall the successful development of cooperation among fraternal countries in fulfilling the "Interkosmos" program. Cosmonauts of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria already have taken part in international space flights together with Soviet cosmonauts. Recently, on 3 June 1980, an orbital flight by an international crew made up of USSR pilot-cosmonaut V. N. Kubasov and Bertalan Farkas, a cosmonaut-researcher and citizen of the Hungarian People's Republic, was concluded successfully. New starts are being prepared for international crews of manned spacecraft.

A guarantee of the further comprehensive development of the fraternal socialist countries lies in their firm unity and solidarity and in their active cooperation. It is for this reason that concern for strengthening the unity and solidarity of countries of the socialist community is deeply reflected in decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of central committees of communist and workers' parties of the socialist states. Multilateral and bilateral meetings of the heads of fraternal parties and states are of great importance for strengthening friendship and cooperation of nations of the socialist countries, for discussing pressing problems for building a new society and for coordinating foreign policy actions. For example, the Crimean meetings and talks by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev with heads of fraternal parties, which have become traditional, make a considerable contribution to the development of long-term cooperation of the socialist states.

The cooperation of socialist countries in the field of ideology, science, culture and mass information has developed successfully in recent years. This permits fraternal parties to coordinate the activities in the sphere of ideological opposition to imperialism, to offer a rebuff to its ideological diversions and to use collective efforts to give peoples of the world the truth about the achievements of real socialism.

A unification of efforts of socialist countries in defense of revolutionary achievements of fraternal nations against encroachment by world imperialism and the reaction is of exceptionally great importance in the overall system of cooperation by the socialist countries. Historical experience has shown that the national independence and sovereignty of each socialist state can be reliably assured only through the joint efforts of the entire socialist community. Not one country large or small can ignore the need for cooperation with other socialist states in the field of defense nor ignore the need for military unity. Without military cooperation the socialist countries would be forced to defend themselves alone against imperialist powers associated into blocs in case of armed aggression against them, which radically

contradicts the principles of socialist internationalism and is fraught with the most serious consequences. Only the unification of all resources of countries in the world socialist community and the unity of their military organizations reliably guarantees the security of each of them and of the community as a whole.

The Warsaw Pact Organization, formed 25 years ago in May 1955, plays an important role in defending socialist achievements. It is important to remind the students that Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia presently are part of this defensive military-political alliance. Creation of this alliance was a response of the European socialist countries to actions of the imperialist powers, which knocked together the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) back in 1949 with the most active participation of the United States, unfolded an arms race unprecedented in scope and scale, and set a course for preparing for war against the USSR and other socialist countries.

The Warsaw Pact Organization vividly embodies Leninist ideas on proletarian internationalism and on the unity and solidarity of countries of the victorious proletariat in defense of achievements of socialism, in a struggle against aggressive imperialist forces and in a struggle against world reaction.

The Warsaw Pact is a voluntary alliance of sovereign states with equal rights. It is founded on principles of total equality, mutual respect and trust, independence and sovereignty of the participants, and nonintervention in their internal affairs. It is permeated with a spirit of friendship, cooperation and comradely mutual assistance.

The Warsaw Pact is truly a defensive organization with no other purpose except to defend the achievements of socialism, create favorable external conditions for the development of a new social system and assurance of a stable peace for the good of all nations. Its participants threaten no one, lay no claim to foreign territories and do not intervene in the internal affairs of other states. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at a reception in Warsaw on 15 May 1980 that "our alliance always was alien to aggressive aspirations. It never was aimed against the interests of any country or group of countries. It was formed for defending the peaceful labor of our peoples, engaged in building a new life. It was formed for our joint struggle for the cause of a firm peace and for respect for the sovereign rights of states and the freedom of nations. And it always has performed its historic mission well and continues to perform it well."

The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) heads the Warsaw Pact Organization. Key problems of international life are brought up at PCC conferences, and they examine the most important issues concerning the strengthening of defenses of the allied countries. General (first) secretaries of central committees of communist and workers' parties and heads of state take part in PCC conferences. Ministers of foreign affairs, ministers of defense, the commander and chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact Nations also are invited.

The class instructor should tell about the jubilee PCC conference held in Warsaw on 14-15 May 1980. This conference unanimously adopted documents of enormous political significance--the Declaration of Warsaw Pact Member Nations, which provides a thorough, comprehensive evaluation of the present international situation and advances new, important initiatives designed to strengthen European and universal peace; and the Statement containing a proposal to hold a summit meeting in the near future for heads of states of all parts of the world. Decisions of the PCC conference are intended to normalize the international situation and provide a new, strong impetus to the process of detente.

The mechanism of military cooperation of socialist countries, which today encompasses practically all aspects of the work of allied armies, is being improved constantly. The Ministers of Defense Committee is the supreme military agency of the Warsaw Pact Organization. Practical leadership of the Joint Armed Forces is carried out by the Joint Command, the Military Council, the Staff and other agencies.

The Joint Armed Forces include operational contingents of troops and fleets assigned from each allied state. The armies of fraternal countries are by their nature, goals and missions armies of a new, socialist type. They are closely linked with the people, manned from top to bottom by representatives of the workers, armed with contemporary military equipment and weapons, and indoctrinated in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism. The ruling communist and workers' parties are their organizers and managers. All this brings armies of the countries of socialism together and makes their soldiers not only brothers in arms, but also brothers in class.

Relationships of fraternal friendship and sincere cooperation were established among armies of the countries of socialism and developed from year to year. The forms of military cooperation are quite varied--joint exercises and maneuvers, an exchange of experience in combat training and party-political work, military science conferences, training methods courses, conferences and so on. The units and combined units of Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Southern, Central and Northern groups of forces temporarily situated on territories of the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland have especially favorable conditions for establishing close military ties with armies of Warsaw Pact countries. Located beyond the borders of their country, Soviet soldiers vigilantly stand combat watch shoulder to shoulder with the soldiers of allied armies, represent their great Motherland with dignity and honor, and raise even higher that high prestige of the army-liberator won by their grandfathers, fathers and older brothers during the Great Patriotic War.

The close military cooperation of Warsaw Pact member nations already has made a worthy contribution toward strengthening the defensive might of the socialist community. It will continue to develop and improve. The CPSU Central Committee Report to the 25th party congress emphasizes: "We are resolute enemies both of a division of the world into opposing military blocs and of the arms race. Our position on this account is well known. But

it must be stated in all clarity: So long as the NATO bloc is preserved and so long as militaristic circles conduct the arms race, our country along with other participants of the Warsaw Pact will reinforce this military-political alliance" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 8).

The contemporary international situation remains complicated and contradictory. Countries of the socialist community are making enormous efforts to ensure that mankind is not plunged into the vortex of a new world war. But the peace-loving course of the USSR and its allies is encountering fierce resistance by the imperialist reaction, with the Chinese leadership being a direct accomplice. Brandishing the bugbear of the mythical "Soviet military threat," militaristic circles of the United States and other western powers attempt to disrupt detente, inflate military budgets and build up an arms race leading to a stronger military danger. The decision made in December of last year by the NATO Council session on stationing American medium-range nuclear missiles in western Europe was an act of extreme danger to the cause of peace. This step by the militarists is aimed at ensuring military superiority over Warsaw Pact nations and disrupting the established equilibrium of forces in their own favor.

The Warsaw Pact member nations naturally cannot regard the military preparations of imperialism with indifference. They are doing everything to ensure that their alliance is strong and indestructible and that it serves as a reliable shield for the great revolutionary achievements of the entire socialist community. Soviet soldiers and their combat friends--soldiers of the fraternal armies--deeply perceive the full extent of their responsibility for the fate of the world and of socialism and for the security of nations. They consider it their sacred duty to preserve high vigilance and strengthen the defensive might of their countries.

In concluding presentation of material on the topic, the propagandist emphasizes that Leninist ideas on the international character of defense of socialism serve as a powerful factor for solidarity of countries of the socialist community and their armies, the soldiers of which are honorably performing their duty as patriots and internationalists and are in constant combat readiness.

/During independent training/ it is recommended that the students study Lenin's work "Speech at a Rally of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment on 2 August 1918" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXVII, 24-26); "Programma KPSS" [CPSU Program] (pp 11-13, 19-25, 132-135); "Konstitutsiya SSSR" [USSR Constitution] (articles 28-32, 69); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Party Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," pp 5-11, 83); Comrade Brezhnev's speech in Warsaw on 15 May 1980 (PRAVDA, 16 May 1980); Chapter Two of the textbook for political studies entitled "V. I. Lenin o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [V. I. Lenin on Defense of the Socialist Homeland] (Voyenizdat, 1977).

During the evening hours it is desirable to arrange a viewing of the fictional films "The Liberation" and "Soldiers of Freedom"; the documentary newsreels "Soldiers of October," "Your Exploit is Immortal," "Soldiers of the People, Soldiers of the World," "And the Sons Developed," "For Our Freedom and Yours" and "A Lesson of History"; and the slidefilms "Combat Cooperation of Armed Forces of the Socialist Countries."

/In the seminar session/ it is advisable to discuss the following questions: 1. V. I. Lenin on internationalism and its role in defense of the achievements of socialism. 2. The international mission of the Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period. 3. Friendship of peoples and combat alliance of armies of the socialist countries is the chief source of their strength and invincibility. 4. The Warsaw Pact is a reliable shield of socialism.

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BOOK REVIEW: MILITARY-ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF JAPAN

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[Review by Candidate of Geographic Sciences A. Stadnichenko, of a book by S. T. Mazhorov, "Voyenno-ekonomicheskiy potentsial sovremennoy Yaponii" (Military-Economic Potential of Contemporary Japan), Moscow, "Nauka," 1979, 200 pages, 85 kopecks, under the heading "Critique and Bibliography": "Japan's Militaristic Aspirations"]

[Text] A book by S. Mazhorov on Japan's military-economic potential merits attention among the monographs devoted to development of the arms race in the modern capitalist world. As the author points out, this country is the third world power in gross national product and in volume of industrial production and the only industrially highly developed capitalist country on the Asiatic Continent.

The book provides a detailed analysis of the industrial basis of Japan's military potential, particularly the electrical power and processing areas, as a base of the ever-intensifying process of militarization, rebirth and development of the Japanese Army and this country's involvement in the arms race.

After Japan's defeat in World War II its Armed Forces were dissolved and military production prohibited. But this ban did not exist for long. The author shows persuasively how the United States, preparing for war in Korea, began to place major orders for production of arms and combat equipment in its enterprises in violation of coordinated decisions on Japan's demilitarization. This marked the beginning of the renaissance of Japan's war production. By the present time this production already has reached a high scientific-technical level and continues to be developed quantitatively and qualitatively. The monograph points out that Japan's industry now has mastered production of all kinds of weapons (except for nuclear weapons) from its own or borrowed development, and this permits it to satisfy the needs of the national Armed Forces almost fully (by 93 percent).

Japan's major monopoly associations which are engaged in the production of military equipment are closely linked with American arms manufacturers. In studying these ties, the author in particular refers to the example of the

Mitsubishi Jukogyo Company, which produces up to 40 percent of arms manufactured in the country. It maintains business contacts with many American military-industrial corporations. Mitsubishi Jukogyo has licenses of 12 American firms, among which are those such as Lockheed and Douglas, which are in the top five major arms producers in the United States.

The monograph thus brings the reader to realize the fact that Japan has formed its own military-industrial complex which cooperates closely with the U.S. military-industrial complex. Ties of the Japanese financial and industrial oligarchy with the militarists are becoming active. In just five years (from 1964 through 1968) 145 senior officers and generals, of 42 percent of this category of persons who left military service, went to serve in industrial companies from the national defense office performing functions of a military ministry. According to Japanese press reports, at the present time 248 retired generals and admirals hold key positions in 81 companies belonging to the defense production committee of the Federation of Economic Organizations. The aforementioned Mitsubishi Jukogyo, which produces fighter-bombers, tanks and small arms, enjoys the services of 19 highly placed military consultants. Among them is former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee T. Iwaya, former ground forces chief of staff H. Minoshi, and former Air Force chief of staff A. Hirano. Another arms factory--Ishikawajima-Harima Jukogyo, which supplies ships for Japan's naval forces, invited Adm H. Samejima and nine other prominent military leaders to work for it; and Kawasaki Jukogyo, which produces warplanes, has 13 generals and admirals on its rolls.

The chapter entitled "Status and Trends in Development of Japan's Armed Forces" is of undoubted interest. In it the author uses extensive factual material drawn primarily from official Japanese sources to study in detail Japan's contemporary Armed Forces, which consist of ground, naval and air forces and which possess a ramified system of air defense. The book shows that they moved long ago beyond the framework of their modest title of "self-defense forces" and are a powerful armed formation capable of conducting offensive strategic operations, and especially in an alliance with the United States.

Against whom do the Japanese "self-defense forces" plan to operate? The monograph contains a specific answer to this question, based on numerous facts. "They are preparing to perform two functions: internal and external. The internal function consists of keeping the exploited part of the population subservient, while the external function is to conduct military operations against other countries and peoples."

After Japan began to slide onto the militaristic path and make unfriendly gestures toward its northwestern neighbor, flirt with Peking's leaders and give in more and more to pressure on Washington's part, special attention has been given to the capability of "self-defense forces" to perform the external function successfully. The corresponding shoots also are rising up on militaristic soil. Japan took a doubtful world leadership in growth

rates of its military budget. In analyzing the system of financing the "self-defense forces," the author indicates how military appropriations are growing from year to year. Since 1970 they have increased sevenfold from \$1.5 billion to \$11 billion. Beginning in April of this year the "intermediate" five-year defense plan began to be implemented, according to which over \$12 billion will be spent on a program for building up the latent arms. The plan envisages transfer of an additional 300 aircraft, 300 tanks, 180 self-propelled guns, 110 APC's, some 40 warships, and a large number of missile launchers and other arms to the "self-defense forces." But even this is little for the Japanese militarists. They are insisting on an ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of the plan in four years.

The accelerated tempo for building up arms being conducted by official Tokyo circles are being encouraged in every possible way by certain highly placed figures in the United States. By shoving Japan toward rearming and an expansion of its military role, the foreign allies intend to take advantage of the Japanese Army as "support forces." They are attempting to include Japan in implementation of their aggressive policy of intervention in the internal affairs of independent states of northeast and southeast Asia and the Indian and Pacific ocean basins.

The Peking hegemonists are acting in this same direction. An official visit to Japan by Chinese premier Hua Kuo-feng in late May had as its chief purpose to prompt Japanese ruling circles to take up extensive military cooperation with China and to achieve maximum "solidarity" from Japan in conducting their aggressive anti-Soviet policy. The Chinese premier's trip became the next action in diplomatic pressure on Japan, which has increased sharply in recent times, for inclining it toward a more active triple military-political cooperation together with the United States.

The Japanese-American "security treaty" also serves to expand the scale of the country's militarization. According to this treaty, at the present time there are 140 bases and military installations on Japanese territory and 50,000 American service personnel. Military ships of the foreign ally with nuclear weapons aboard call on its ports. As the book points out, this treaty consolidated the already existing system of coordination of operations of Japan's Armed Forces with U.S. naval and air forces in the Far East. Ties between Japanese Armed Forces and American Armed Forces in this country and in the Pacific have been supported and are being supported at different levels: from the political leadership to direct contact of staffs and the command element of all branches of the armed forces. The Japanese-American Consultative Security Council, which includes representatives of the political and military leadership of both countries, holds a central place in the system of the joint command.

In examining direct ties between the armed forces of the two countries in resolving issues of strategy and tactics, the author concludes that the close military alliance between Japan and the United States places the Japanese government in direct dependence on the foreign ally in matters of military strategy. The very same is attested by events of recent times as

well. In particular, participation of the Japanese Navy and Air Force for the first time in the spring of this year in the Pacific maneuvers "Rimpac-80." They took place under the general command of the United States and the navies of Canada, Australia and New Zealand took part in them in addition to the American Third Fleet. According to estimates of the periodical press, this opens up new opportunities for reinforcing military cooperation of Japan and the United States; it is an attempt to tie the Japanese-American "security treaty" with the system of the NATO and ANZUS blocs; and it serves as one further proof of why powerful "self-defense forces" are being created. These are only a few of the fruits of what in the language of American-Japanese diplomacy is termed "heightened coordination" between the two countries within the framework of their military treaty signed at the height of the "cold war."

A separate section of the monograph studies the policy of Japanese ruling circles with respect to the "self-defense forces" cadres. Although this policy is not directly aimed at a rebirth of caste privileges for the military typical of the prewar period, it unquestionably pursues the goal of placing those who have served and are serving in the Armed Forces in a position of a special social layer.

Counting civilian employees, the size of the Japanese Armed Forces presently exceeds 295,000 persons. This is the backbone of a much larger Army which could be deployed in case of "extraordinary circumstances" in minimum periods of time inasmuch as, as is clear from the data cited, the "self-defense forces" are densely manned with officers and NCO's. By the mid 1970's they made up 58.2 percent of the total size of the Army. The author concludes that this manning of the Armed Forces is the result of the Japanese government's personnel policy conducted over a long period of time. This policy concerns not only those who are serving, but also those who are released from the Armed Forces. They are viewed as a reserve and appropriate organizations such as the "Society of Friends of the Army," "Fathers and Brothers of 'Self-Defense Forces' Personnel," "Society of Unity with the 'Self-Defense Forces'" and similar ones perform a certain amount of work among them. Associations of former naval officers and officers of the former ground forces, disbanded after the end of World War II, have been revived. Revanchism of course is the real ideology of these organizations. And, as noted in the book, even under conditions of constitutional limitations the revanchists hold a course for propaganda of previous ideals of bushido--the military samurai morality--and activation of anticommunism and antisovietism.

The yearning for a return to times long past when the samurai rushed into military campaigns and pictured in their imaginations a Japanese "mutual prosperity sphere" extending to almost half the world gave rise to a broad campaign for glorifying past wars. There is especially frequent mention of the "victorious" Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which is presented as an example of the valor of the Imperial Army. It stands to reason that in this instance there is silence about the indisputable fact that Japan itself was extremely exhausted by the war. Japanese reactionary circles prefer to be silent about defeats during the intervention in the Soviet Far East in

1918-1922, aggression in the latter half of the 1930's at Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin-Gol River, and the defeat of the Kwantung Army in 1945.

By fanning militaristic sentiments unrestrainedly among the people, Japan's ruling circles are more and more willing to repeat after Peking and its foreign guardians the fabrications about the "Soviet threat," and they are being drawn more and more into the orbit of antisovietism. Under the cloak of this slander, the Japanese military is pulling armored forces into the northern part of the island of Hokkaido and plans to mine the straits of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima.

In the final account, all this might do serious harm to the good-neighbor status between our countries which took almost a quarter-century to arrange after restoration of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. And this is neither in the national interests of Japan nor the interests of peace in Asia. It is quite obvious that mutual trust and mutually profitable cooperation are in the vital interests both of the Japanese and the Soviet peoples. These are the relations the USSR is attempting to develop with Japan. In particular, the Soviet proposal to conclude a treaty on good-neighbor relations and cooperation between the two countries also has the very same goal. Such a treaty is a most important guarantee of peace and security, needed not only by both countries, but by the entire Far East and Asia. Whoever ignores this truth voluntarily or involuntarily shares responsibility for the aggravation of the international situation together with the Peking hegemonists and aggressive U.S. circles.

In conclusion it should be stated that this book has shown in detail how and in what form the military-industrial potential of postwar Japan was revived and along what path it is being built up; how ideological cultivation of the populace and Army of this country is conducted; and what techniques are used for lulling the vigilance of broad masses of workers and the progressive public.

The book is written in a clear, popular language and contains a large amount of factual material which is systematized and generalized in a good manner. Many questions examined in the book still have been insufficiently covered in our literature. It would appear the military reader will evaluate this unquestionably timely and useful work on its merits.

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BOOK REVIEW: ADVERSE EFFECTS OF DRUNKENNESS

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[Review by Col Justice A. Khalin of the book by A. Voropay entitled
"Rasplata za bezvoliye (O vrede p'yanstva)" (Retribution for a Weak Will [On
the Harm of Drunkenness]), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1979, 96 pages, 15 kopecks:
"Retribution for a Weak Will"]

[Text] A number of books and pamphlets have been written in recent years in our country about the harm of drunkenness and alcoholism and about the pernicious consequences of this monstrous vestige of the past. But there is still little popular science literature elaborating the problem of guarding soldiers against this social evil. For this reason the publication of the book by Candidate of Medical Sciences, Honored Physician of the RSFSR Col Med Serv A. Voropay entitled "Rasplata za bezvoliye" is very timely.

On the basis of the latest medical research and abundant medical experience, the author convincingly tells about the pernicious influence of drunkenness, which robs a person of his health, strength, intellect, creative abilities, happiness and joy, and sometimes even his life. Debunking the erroneous nature of delusions about the "medicinal property" of alcohol, he writes that medical science considers such "treatment" not only to be useless, but even dangerous for life. Back in 1915 the Pirogov Congress of Russian Physicians wrote in a special resolution: "There is not a single organ in the human body which would not be subject to the destructive effects of alcohol."

Alcohol has a harmful influence on literally all systems of the human body. This conclusion in the book is confirmed irrefutably by numerous examples. It gives answers to many troubling questions and graphically demonstrates what a great moral, political and economic harm this evil does to society and how perniciously the use of alcoholic beverages is reflected in all aspects of a person's life.

Drunkenness is especially intolerable under conditions of military service, inasmuch as it may cause harm to combat readiness. The book traces in specific examples the danger which alcohol conceals for pilots, navymen and a

large detachment of military specialists in the Army--drivers of vehicles of different classes and purposes and driver-mechanics of armored equipment.

To control equipment capably soldiers of many specialties require such qualities, in addition to others, as sharp powers of observation, good vision and hearing, precision and proportionality of movements, and constant control over their actions. But even a slight portion of alcohol reduces these qualities to naught. The author states that scientists have established that just one jigger of vodka can cause disruption of oral and visual perception and aggravate depth perception, which permits a person to determine the distance at which a particular object is located. He orients himself worse on light and sound signals and so on. The negative effect of alcohol is not limited to this, however. In a drunken state a person loses control over himself, becomes talkative and may damage state interests. Under Army conditions such deviations in the standard of behavior are especially inadmissible, because they may lead to the divulgence of a military secret or to a sharp reduction of combat readiness both of an individual combat post and of a subunit as a whole.

It is not by chance that one of the sections in the book is titled "Alcohol and Crime." Drunkenness is the source of a majority of law violations. And the author is deeply correct in asserting that alcohol is an unseen presence in the dock in many criminal cases as an accomplice and an inciter to crime, and that alcohol is closely intertwined with crime.

The idea of the need for a decisive and uncompromising struggle against drunkenness can be traced through the book. To eradicate this shameful phenomenon, the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" demands the use of all means of propaganda and indoctrination, and to conduct the fight against drunkenness systematically, purposefully and irreconcilably, using both persuasion in words and the strict force of the law for these purposes.

There is no question that this book will serve as a good support in activating this propaganda and struggle. It will be read by every soldier with interest and benefit.

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